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Christian Legal Society v. Martinez:
Six Frames
by TONI M. MASSARO*
On an historic last day of the 2009 Term, the Supreme Court bid
farewell to Justice John Paul Stevens, incorporated the Second
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment,' and announced its
decision in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, a challenge to the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law's ("Hastings")
nondiscrimination policy for official Registered Student
Organizations ("RSOs").
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the majority opinion in
Martinez, in which the determinative analytical moves were to treat
this case as a government "carrot" case, not a regulation "stick" case,
and to apply the test used for a limited public forum to the RSO
program. Under the latter test, conditions on access are permissible
if they are "reasonable" and "viewpoint-neutral."4 And, under the
"carrot" line of cases, government likewise has the right to condition
benefits on compliance with "reasonable" and "viewpoint-neutral"
rules.'
The majority's determinative factual move was to assume that
the nondiscrimination condition was an "all-comers" policy-that is,
all student organizations had to admit all students who wished to
* Thanks go to the Symposium editors, and to fellow participants at the Hastings
October 1, 2010, conference: Ethan Schulman, Vikram Amar, Ashutosh Bhagwat, Alan
Brownstein, David Levine, Rory Little, Robert Luther 1II, and Julie Nice. I also thank my
co-panelists at the University of Arizona Supreme Court Annual Review Program:
Maureen Mahoney, Dave Marcus, Sally Rider and Judge Neil Wake. For helpful earlier
discussions of the underlying issues I thank Steve Adamczyk and Judith Leonard.
1. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
2. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
3. Id. at 2986.
4. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 147-98.
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join-as the parties had stipulated.' According to Justice Ginsburg,
Hastings had a significant interest in preserving diversity and
prohibiting discrimination when its name and resources were
involved.! The "all-comers" policy was a reasonable and viewpoint-
neutral means of advancing those goals.
Justice Samuel Alito argued in vigorous dissent that the case was
only remotely a government subsidy case, that the Court's ruling
dealt a serious blow to the First Amendment," and that the result was
hostile to the purported university interest in diverse viewpoints."o He
believed that the case should have been controlled by Healy v. James,
in which the Court struck down the exclusion of a chapter of the
Students for a Democratic Society ("SDS") from a public university
campus." In his view, the principle that actually drove the outcome
was that there is "no freedom for expression that offends prevailing
standards of political correctness in our country's institutions of
higher learning."2
The tension between the majority and dissenting opinions
highlights a deep and abiding conundrum within the applicable
doctrine. Case law strongly supports the government's power to
condition access to its benefits, property, and imprimatur in content-
specific," even viewpoint-specific ways.14 Indeed, some cases impose
an affirmative duty on the government to prevent use of its resources
to promote certain ends-most notably ends that violate the Equal
Protection Clause or the Establishment Clause." At some point, the
Court has stated, government subsidies or other support of private
actors can become government entanglement with private activities
that constitutes state action." To avoid attribution of private
6. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984.
7. Id. at 2989.
8. Id. at 3007 (Alito, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 3020.
10. Id. at 3016-17.
11. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
12. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S.
47 (2006); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality
opinion); Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
15. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); see also infra text
accompanying notes 70-78, 88-98.
16. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Norwood, 413 U.S. 455; Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
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purposes to itself, the government must effect a certain distance from
the private actors. More generally, however, government has wide
discretion to dictate how its resources and property are used, as
necessary to promote substantive, non-neutral government ends. To
hold otherwise would be to interfere with the coordinate branches'
and state authorities' undeniable ability to set policy and enforce
common goals, not to mention perform the wide range of activities
that fall under the big tent of government functions-all without close
judicial supervision or second-guessing.
Yet the case law also demands-occasionally-that conditions on
government resources and property not arbitrarily fence out
applicants where their exclusion appears to be, or is discriminatory or
unduly burdensome." The government's spending power is not a
license to twist recipients' messages unreasonably, invade their
autonomy unduly, or compel them to cede basic liberties in exchange
for government support where it is not necessary to do so to promote
government ends. The purse strings power also should be exercised
in a sensible and proportional manner-conditions should be
germane and not veer off the government programmatic mark. And
government property often is not exclusively held by government for
"its" purposes; indeed, the pronoun "it" is a misleading one when
applied to "our" government programs and resources. The sense of
government property as "ours" is most pronounced when it has forum
features, and when access is requested for expression, not conduct or
other purposes. Recognizing this, the Court has developed
sophisticated, even Byzantine, constitutional brakes on government
control over its property, programs, and grants that are particularly
visible in First Amendment cases.
As we shall see, however, the Court rarely applies these brakes
itself; rather, it allows the government actors to police these
constitutional boundaries." The cases in which the Court does
intervene are very much the exception, not the rule. They typically
deal with rules that have been applied in an uneven manner, within a
category of activities that the government already has allowed for
(1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); cf Moose Lodge v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). But see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (mere fact
that government subsidizes private conduct does not make it "state action").
17. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169




others. In recent years, they also have offered religious actors, in
particular, judicial protection.
Choosing between these two basic threads always has been
controversial: One person's worthy government end is another
person's unconstitutional condition. The haziness of the distinction
between these competing characterizations of conditions on access to
government resources and government imprimatur led inexorably to
the doctrinal faceoff revealed in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.
Given the factual peculiarities of the case, and given the
pervasiveness of the "unconstitutional conditions" problem, Martinez
is hardly the final word on this subject. Nevertheless, the case is an
important one, especially for what it did not do.
Martinez also underscores an ever-important selective
indifference problem.19 Those with acute sensitivity to the coercive or
dignity-dismissive aspects of subsidy or access conditions as they
relate to religious groups were well-represented. They argued that
Hastings had engaged in discriminatory behavior against Christian
Legal Society ("CLS"): Not only by applying the policy in an unfair
manner, but also by failing to accommodate its beliefs and make
exceptions for its conduct. At least in part, its argument was that
even neutral rules can impose wildly disproportionate burdens that
deserve a second constitutional look.
In other words, special treatment-an exemption from the
general rules-was necessary to place CLS on equal footing with
other student groups, in terms of freedom of expressive association
and identity. Taking individual freedoms seriously, they insist,
requires leavening the weight of rules that fall this unevenly. The
irony, of course, is that the same argument so often has been made by
members of other minority groups-including gay groups-to compel
closer judicial scrutiny of ostensibly neutral government policies and
practices that impose disproportionate burdens on some citizens or
groups (e.g., nobody can marry someone of the same sex; nobody can
ingest peyote; nobody can wear a yarmulke or other nonconforming
headgear in the military). In most cases, however, the constitutional
answer is a harsh one: Equal treatment, not equal outcomes, is the
constitutional standard, even when equal treatment means grossly
disproportionate consequences.20 Absent a showing of intent to
19. See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1976).
20. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (absent showing of intent to
discriminate, rational basis test applies in Equal Protection cases); Emp't Div., Dep't of
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create the discriminatory burden, the government typically need only
have a reasonable basis for adopting the rule in question.2 1 Nothing
about Martinez altered this constitutional baseline, even though CLS
made an especially appealing argument against its application here.
In this essay, I locate Christian Legal Services v. Martinez within
this wider doctrinal landscape, and show that the Court must choose
among several analytical frames whenever it analyzes a condition on a
government subsidy. The Court in Martinez identified two primary
frames to choose from: "Carrots" versus "sticks." In fact, however,
there were multiple frames implicated by the facts of the case,2 each
of which would have had a significant impact on the outcome. Some
of these frames are best viewed through the lens of civil rights history,
when the Court was more vigilant in policing government action that
facilitated private discriminatory conduct.
I outline six possible frames for Martinez. Under four of these
frames, the government decision to condition access to RSO status on
compliance with a nondiscrimination clause was permissible. Under
the first two of these four, the government arguably had no choice but
to impose the condition.
Under the third and fourth frames, the government had the right
to condition RSO status on compliance with its conditions, but was
not obliged to impose the condition. Only under the final two frames
was governmental power to impose the nondiscrimination conditions
even arguably permissible. Under the fifth frame, the government
Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (a facially neutral law of general
applicability can be applied against religious dissenters if the law is rational, subject to
three exceptions).
21. One exception is a content-neutral rule that has a burden on speech, when the
intermediate scrutiny test applies. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Nonviolence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (outlining the three-part test for content-neutral time, place, and
manner regulations). See also the exceptions outlined in Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
22. A narrower way to tease out the different sides of approaching Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez is by analyzing the case under the First Amendment public forum
doctrine. Even this narrower frame leads to multiple "subframes" of analysis. The Court
and the litigants restricted their inquiry to these frames. I argue, however, that public
forum analysis merely is a free speech application of the more general problem of
constitutionally permissible conditions on government benefits. The unconstitutional
conditions on subsidies problem, in turn, is an application of the more general problem of
when government support for private ends becomes state action. Thus it is useful to locate
Martinez within a wider constitutional matrix. Doing so better reveals just how
adventuresome the CLS request for exemption from the non-discrimination condition
really was, as a matter of doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 145-98.
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conditions could be challenged facially or as applied, though as
applied challenges stand a better chance of success.
Under the final frame, the government could impose the
conditions as a general matter, but as applied to certain student
organizations like CLS the conditions arguably could not be
sustained; for these student organizations the burden of complying
with the condition was constitutionally significant and may have
entitled them to an exemption from the otherwise constitutional
policy.
All six frames have in common the "attribution" question, which
is derived from the state action frame. Indeed, this is the backdrop to
all of the other frames, which likewise involve the question of
whether private conduct that government seeks to control is
reasonably attributable to the government itself. Once this often
complex, highly contextual question is answered, the rest of the legal
analysis falls into place, given the government's undeniable power to
spend money, engage in speech, control property, and advance ends
that are nonneutral, viewpoint-specific and even-in these senses-
discriminatory. Only those who comply with the conditions are
entitled to access.
The only remaining questions then become: (1) does the
applicant satisfy the non-neutral conditions; and (2) are the non-
neutral ends beyond government regulatory power for some other
reason? In other words, a search for government "neutrality" in
defining its programs, its property, or its grant conditions usually is a
red herring, as is a search for the size of the burden imposed by a
government condition. Government is never truly neutral when it
allocates resources. The first step in a government fund/forum case
always involves a government decision to create and define the
parameters of a program, a step that clearly is attributable to the
government and is inherently nonneutral. In this respect, the
concurring opinion of departing Justice Stevens was spot on. A
demand that government rules be "neutral" only comes into play at
the second step: Allocation of benefits or access among applicants
who satisfy the program/forum criteria.
The state action frame also illuminates concerns about
government "passive participation." The Court in recent decades has
tailored the state action doctrine very narrowly, such that very few
government programs that involve private participants become
"government action" per se. Yet lingering concerns about
government entanglement with private discrimination still affect how
574 [Vol. 38:3
CLS V. MARTINEZ: SIX FRAMES
some government actors view their duties, and what conditions they
are likely to place on public funds or fora-and rightly so.
State action analysis lifts to the foreground the many ways in
which the status quo is not neutral, and why disparate impact still
matters-even when it is not unconstitutional. The selective
indifference problem identified above is particularly vivid when
government action and government inaction are viewed through this
lens.
Finally, I argue that conditions on access to government and
funding generally should be analyzed through one set of criteria,
rather than through separate tests. First Amendment cases like
Martinez should be reconciled with other cases that involve arguably
unconstitutional burdens on access to government benefits so that the
common concerns about government responsibility-or lack
thereof-for private parties' actions can be viewed in a wider context,
not just in fact-intensive isolation, and more coherent standards might
emerge. I identify eight "conditions on conditions" that govern all
such cases, and suggest that courts apply these factors to determine
whether the conditions past constitutional muster. One of these
criteria speaks directly to government's legitimate concern about an
appearance of government endorsement, even when applicable case
law would not hold it legally responsible for a private party's actions.
Martinez is an excellent case to see why this criterion is important to
government officials' ability to provide support to private parties
without risking complicity in their diverse, discriminatory ends.
I. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez
Hastings, a public law school, extended official recognition to law
student groups through its RSO program. The conditions of RSO
status included the following:
* Noncommercial organization;
* Membership limited to Hastings students;
* Submission of bylaws to Hastings for approval;
* Execution of a license agreement, if the organization intends
to use the Hastings name or logo;
* Compliance with Hastings's "Policies and Regulations
Applying to College Activities, Organizations and Students;"
* Compliance with Hastings's Policy on Nondiscrimination."
23. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2979.
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The condition that prompted the lawsuit was the Policy on
Nondiscrimination ("Policy"), which provided as follows:
[Hastings] is committed to a policy against legally
impermissible, arbitrary or unreasonable discriminatory
practices. All groups, including administration, faculty, student
governments, [Hastings]-owned student residence facilities and
programs sponsored by [Hastings], are governed by this policy
of nondiscrimination. [Hastings's] policy on nondiscrimination
is to comply fully with applicable law.... [Hastings] shall not
discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual
orientation. This nondiscrimination policy covers admission,
access and treatment in Hastings-sponsored programs and
activities.'
Hastings interpreted the Policy to mandate acceptance of all
comers: "School-approved groups must 'allow any student to
participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the
organization, regardless of [her] status or beliefs.""'
CLS sought an exemption from the Policy and was denied.
According to CLS, its bylaws require all members to sign a
"Statement of Faith" pledging to conduct their lives in accordance
with its principles.26 Among the tenets is that sexual activity should
not occur outside of marriage between a man and a woman, which
would exclude from affiliation anyone who engages in "unrepentant"
fornication or homosexual conduct.27 In addition, students whose
religious beliefs differ from the Statement of Faith cannot become
members of CLS.
CLS believed that the Hastings nondiscrimination policy was
unconstitutional, and brought suit alleging that Hastings's refusal to
grant it RSO status violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to free speech, freedom of expressive association, and free
exercise of religion. Hastings countered that the nondiscrimination
condition on access to RSO status was reasonable and viewpoint-
neutral, and thus within its right to impose on all RSOs. It noted that
CLS could still meet on campus, and had been allowed other forms of
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2980.
27. Id.
[Vol. 38:3576 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
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access, but it was not entitled to the benefits of official RSO status,
i.e., use of school funds, channels of communication, and school name
and logo."
A central factual question in the case was whether the Policy as
written was applied to the student chapter of CLS, or if the Policy as
interpreted was applied to the group. In Part II of the majority
opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that the parties had stipulated below
that the Policy was an "all-comers" policy, and that the Court would
not second-guess that stipulation.29 Whether this was in fact the
Hastings policy (and if so, when it took effect), whether Hastings
faithfully applied this policy across-the-board, and whether the terms
of the stipulation between the parties was as the majority described
them all were strongly denied by the dissent.o Justice Alito
concluded that the parties had stipulated that CLS was denied RSO
status because it did not comply with the written Policy, not an "all-
comers" policy." Justice Alito also pointed to evidence that the "all-
comers" policy "was announced as a pretext to justify viewpoint
discrimination."32 As he read the record, Hastings did allow other
student groups to select officers and members based on beliefs and
ideals: "Only religious groups were required to admit students who
did not share their views."33 Under this construction of the facts,
viewpoint discrimination plainly occurred.
The dissent also disagreed about the evidence regarding the
burden on CLS. Justice Ginsburg emphasized the ways in which CLS
still enjoyed access to campus, and how the organization continued to
flourish." Justice Alito regarded these conclusions as "quite
amazing"" and pointed to other evidence that in his view
28. Id. at 2981.
29. Id. at 2984.
30. Id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 3005. He also noted that Hastings admitted in its answer that it did not
follow an "all-comers" policy; instead, it "allowed 'political, social, and cultural
organizations to select officers and members who are dedicated to a particular set of ideals
or beliefs."' Id. at 3003.
32. Id. at 3001 (arguing that "[o]verwhelming evidence .. . shows that Hastings denied
CLS's application pursuant to the Nondiscrimination Policy and that the accept-all-comers
policy was nowhere to be found until it was mentioned by a former dean in a deposition
taken well after this case began").
33. Id. at 3010. On remand, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the issue of whether the
policy was a "pretext" was not presented by CLS. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Wu, 626
F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2010).
34. Id. at 2981 (majority opinion).
35. Id. at 3006 (Alito, J., dissenting).
substantiated CLS's claim that denial of RSO status was a significant
burden. Moreover, CLS is an expressive association that exists
primarily, if not exclusively, to advance particular ideas. To require it
to yield to conditions that subvert its message and associational
cohesion was beyond coercive; CLS characterized it as "absurd." -
Although the dissent thought that Healy v. James was "largely
controlling," it did engage the majority on the doctrinal point of
whether the Hastings policy was a permissible regulation in a limited
public forum. Either way, the dissent concluded, denial of RSO status
to CLS was unconstitutional given the evidence of discriminatory
application of the Policy.
Finally, Justice Alito believed that "funding plays a very small
role in this case. Most of what CLS sought and was denied-such as
permission to set up a table on the law school patio-would have
been virtually cost free. If every such activity is regarded as a matter
of funding, the First Amendment rights of students at public
universities will be at the mercy of the administration."3 In other
words, this was not a carrot case but a forum case-and one in which
the access barrier was neither reasonable nor viewpoint neutral."
Given these factual disputes, the provenance of the case may be
fairly limited. Only Justice Stevens made clear in his concurring
36. Id. at 2992 (majority opinion) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 49 Christian Legal
Soc., v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371)).
37. Id. at 3009 (Alito, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 3007. Alito's view of the scant import of funding shored up his conclusion
that this case was virtually indistinguishable from Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), in
which the Court struck down on First Amendment grounds a public college's refusal to
recognize a local chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society. He noted that he saw
"only two possible distinctions between Healy and the present case. The first is that Healy
did not involve any funding, but .. . funding plays only a small part in this case. And if
Healy would otherwise prevent Hastings from refusing to register CLS, I see no good
reason why the potential availability of funding should enable Hastings to deny all of the
other rights that go with registration. This leaves just one way of distinguishing Healy: the
identity of the student group." Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3008 (Alito, J., dissenting).
39. In fact, one can argue this is not literally a "government funding" case for another
reason: the source of the funds distributed to the student organizations was derived from
student fees. CLS thus had a stronger claim to "its" share of that pie than might be the
case when general tax funds are the source of program funding. The Court in Board of
Regents of University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000), dealt with a
related issue of whether a student could challenge a mandatory student fee that went to
support a variety of student organizations, some of which engaged in political or
ideological advocacy. The Court rejected the students' argument that this fee constituted
a form of "compelled affirmation" of ideas with which the students' disagreed. As long as
the funds were distributed equally among the student groups on a viewpoint-neutral basis,
the students could not claim a violation of their First Amendment rights.
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opinion that he believed Hastings had power to impose the Policy as
written, as well as construed." Justice Ginsburg did not reach this
question. Justice Anthony Kennedy also wrote a concurring opinion,
in which he noted that "if it were shown that the all-comers policy
was either designed or used to infiltrate the group or challenge its
leadership in order to stifle its views," this would be a different case.41
But he regarded the Policy as construed as a reasonable way to
advance professional education and a culture of deliberation. A
majority of the Court thus upheld an "all-comers" policy if and only if
is not a pretext for discrimination on the basis of viewpoint.
Whether the Policy as written was a legitimate condition on RSO
status or on receipt of other government benefits therefore remains
unclear. Moreover, five justices upheld the Policy on the assumption
that this was a subsidy case, in which a key aspect of government
power to impose the nondiscrimination conditions on the student
groups hinged on government power over "carrots," not "sticks."42
Consequently, the case sheds little light on the limits of direct
government regulatory power to prohibit discrimination by private
parties.
Nevertheless, all of the justices conceded that the government
can condition access to its property and resources on a demand that
parties observe nondiscrimination rules, provided the rules are
"reasonable" and "viewpoint neutral." "Reasonableness" does not
mean most reasonable or even advisable, according to Justice
Ginsburg.43  "Viewpoint neutrality" means conditions that are
"justified without reference to the content [or viewpoint] of the
regulated speech."" That is, the nondiscrimination rules must target
the act of rejecting others, not the reasons for rejecting them.45
Finally, the application of these rules must be even-handed.
When these conditions are satisfied, exemptions to
nondiscrimination conditions usually need not be granted as a matter
of constitutional law, regardless of the burden on an affected
40. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2996 (Stevens, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 3000 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He also thought the case would be different
"if there were a showing that in a particular case the purpose or effect of the policy was to
stifle speech or make it ineffective." Id.
42. Id. at 2986 (majority opinion).
43. Id. at 2992.
44. Id. at 2994 (emphasis added) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989)).
45. Id.
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individual or group. Although it helps if the individual or group has
alternative avenues of expression and association, the government is
not obliged to create or fund these alternative avenues.
The three cases that the Court considered most pertinent to the
constitutional issues and the facts of Martinez were Healy v. James,46
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,47 and
Widmar v. Vincenti8 All three dealt with public universities and
access claims by student groups.49 All three were, according to the
majority, distinguishable on the ground that the public schools in
these cases singled out the student groups for adverse treatment;
benefits were withheld because of their viewpoints.o
In Martinez, in contrast, CLS was not singled out for adverse
treatment because of its religious views. Rather, it was denied RSO
status and benefits because of its failure to comply with an across-the-
board, "neutral" rule that required all student groups to admit "all
comers." The majority viewed the nondiscrimination rule as
reasonable, given the educational context in which the rule was
adopted. Although the school was entitled to no deference on the
question of whether it exceeded constitutional bounds, it was entitled
to deference on the point of whether its chosen pedagogical approach
was sound.5 ' Thus the Court respected the following justifications
offered by Hastings for the "all-comers" policy: It "'ensures that the
leadership, educational, and social opportunities afforded by the
[RSOs] are available to all students;"' it allows Hastings to avoid an
inquiry into an RSO's motivation for excluding a member; it
encourages tolerance of diverse backgrounds; and it reflects state law
antidiscrimination values and thus prevents diversion of state monies
and benefits to ends that conflicted with state policy.52
Justice Ginsburg noted with approval that Hastings had offered
CLS alternative channels of communication. Again, she did not
assert that the school itself had to provide these alternatives, but
noted that in speech cases the availability of alternative avenues of
expression is part of the burden analysis. The student group was
allowed access to school facilities for meetings, and was otherwise
46. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
47. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
48. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 147-50, 158-66.
50. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2993.
51. Id. at 2988-89.
52. Id. at 2989-90.
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able to congregate and communicate with fellow students on campus,
outside of official channels." Like other private student affinity
groups-e.g., fraternities and sororities-CLS thus had vehicles for
reaching like-minded Hastings students.
That Hastings might have adopted another rule-one that
accommodated religious groups and allowed them to set membership
rules based on adherence to their tenets-did not doom the Policy.
In Justice Ginsburg's words, "the advisability of Hastings' policy does
not control its permissibility."5 4 The risk that student saboteurs might
infiltrate student groups to subvert the groups' messages was more
conjectural than real, and could be dealt with by Hastings were it to
materialize:" "A reasonable policy need not anticipate and
preemptively close off every opportunity for avoidance or
manipulation."56
The heart of the matter, of course, was that religionists were
obliged to forego their religious identity in order to obtain RSO
status. They were not allowed to favor coreligionists or expect
members to adhere to their tenets if they wanted to receive status and
benefits. In short, they could not be CLS and also comply with the
RSO condition. They believed that the link between expressive
association and group identity was stronger than a garden variety
freedom of expression claim. Indeed, it was so strong that Hastings
should have been required to allow CLS-and other affinity groups
with similar concerns-to associate around its ideas without losing
these particular government benefits and this form of equal forum
access.
The majority's response to this burden on CLS was that
"[e]xclusion ... has two sides. Hastings, caught in the crossfire
between a group's desire to exclude and students' demand for equal
access, may reasonably draw a line in the sand permitting all
organizations to express what they wish but no group to discriminate
in membership."" Such a policy also is viewpoint-neutral, because it
requires that all groups accept all comers. That the burden it
53. Id. at 2991.
54. Id. at 2992.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2993.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2993-94; cf Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (unanimously
upholding law that imposed greater punishments for bias-motivated crimes, on the ground
that penalty enhancements were directed at conduct, not speech).
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imposes falls more heavily on some groups than others does not
render it viewpoint-specific. 59  The justification for the Policy-
preventing the act of exclusion-was content and viewpoint neutral.
Again, it was directed at conduct, not speech."
The majority saw nothing in the Court's freedom of expressive
association cases that required a different analysis or result. For one
thing, the relevant expressive association cases involved government
regulatory, not purse strings, power-i.e., whether a private
association could be compelled to accept someone as a member of the
association where his or her presence would undermine the
expressive association's self-proclaimed message, when the
association sought no government benefits or imprimatur.62 These
cases require-at least in theory-that the government have a
compelling interest, unrelated to suppression of ideas, in forcing the
association to accept such a member. Moreover, even a compelling
interest will not suffice when it might be advanced by significantly less
61restrictive means. In the most recent such case, Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, the Court did not consider the government interest
in nondiscrimination to be a sufficiently compelling reason to require
the Boy Scouts to accept an openly gay person as a scoutmaster.
Where, however, the association is allowed to exist in its
preferred form but seeks greater access to a limited government
forum or to government benefits, without complying with its
conditions, there is no reason to treat its access request any
differently than any other applicant's. In the majority's view, "speech
and expressive-association rights are closely linked" and "[wihen
these intertwined rights arise in exactly the same context, it would be
anomalous for a restriction on speech to survive constitutional review
under our limited-public-forum test only to be invalidated as an
impermissible infringement of expressive association."6 In fact, if the
government were required to exempt expressive associations from its
conditions on access, this would defeat the very point of limited
59. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2994 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
63. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648-49.
64. Id.
65. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985.
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access forums. The definition of such forums is that they are
restricted by the government to topics or categories of speakers.6
Framed in this way, Martinez actually was, as Justice Stevens
observed, quite straightforward. Whether the Policy was an "all-
comers" policy, or one that defined categories of unlawful
discrimination, it was a legitimate exercise of government power.67
This was not a regulatory case, but a subsidy case. It was not about
suppression of speech, but suppression of the act of exclusion. And
this was not an "open commons" that the school happened to
maintain; it was a "mechanism through which Hastings confers
certain benefits and pursues certain aspects of its educational
mission.... [A] university must treat all participants evenhandedly.
But [it] need not remain neutral-indeed it could not remain
neutral-in determining which goals the program will serve and
which rules are best suited to facilitate those goals.""
As I will show, however, each of these assumptions was
debatable. Even if one ignores the problematic and contested factual
record, this was a sticky matter. One way of seeing this is to examine
the narrow legal issues on which the parties focused. As the split
within the Court suggests, the applicable case law does point two
ways in terms of whether nondiscrimination conditions on funding
can be applied to private associations whose tenets require them to
discriminate." Though the clearer path is the one the Court followed,
the outcome in Martinez was not easy to predict even within this
narrow framing of the case. Conditions on benefits and fora do not
differ as sharply from direct regulation of private conduct as the
"carrots versus sticks" dichotomy implies. Nor do conditions on
benefits and conditions on fora differ as sharply as the dissent's
"funding-plays-a-small-role" point implies. But when all agree-as
they did in Martinez-that the case involves a limited public forum,
then exclusion for failure to adhere to a point-of-view about sexuality
becomes very problematic. One can label this a "conduct" versus
"speech" regulation, but the line between these two categories is
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2995 (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 2998.
69. The best piece of scholarship to analyze these issues is Eugene Volokh's
impressive article, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1919 (2006). He concludes that government may limit its subsidies to
groups that do not discriminate on the basis of religion, sexual orientation, race, gender,
ethnicity, and similar factors and argues that nondiscrimination rules are content neutral,
provided they are applied even-handedly against all groups that violate the policy.
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likewise blurry, and the bottom line here was that CLS was excluded
because it required the act of professing a belief.
The fuzziness of all of these lines is generally understood and is
not my primary focus here. Rather, my goal is to outline other frames
of analysis that the Court ignored and that might have made the
admittedly complex question of whether government
nondiscrimination conditions on RSO status are constitutional
somewhat easier to parse. In particular, viewing Martinez through
the state action lens is helpful in seeing why "neutrality" is an
incomplete-often misleading-measure of whether access conditions
on government benefits or on access to a forum is constitutional. A
much more important question, in terms of the judicial outcome, is
whether the activity in question can reasonably be attributed to the
government itself. The stronger the link between the government
and the ostensibly private activity in question, the weaker the claim
becomes that a condition on private participation is unconstitutional.
Even a link that is clearly not strong enough to satisfy the state action
doctrine will be enough to justify government power to determine the
conditions of private participation-in decidedly "non-neutral" and
"viewpoint-specific" ways. This is particularly true when the private
party seeks access to government funds or fora but wishes to exclude
others in ways that jar nondiscrimination sensibilities.
When the nature of the private discrimination is still socially
pervasive-which tends to be true when a civil rights principle has not
yet matured into more general public and private acceptance-then
government must be even more cautious about allowing private
parties to deploy public resources to further their private expressive
and associational ends. The risk and the impact of "passive
participation" by government are potentially higher. Of course,
government's decision to condition public resources on compliance
with a "new" nondiscrimination principle often will evoke especially
deep emotions because it unsettles more status quo expectations.
Thus, it is with nondiscrimination conditions that prohibit (or have
the effect of prohibiting) discrimination based on sexual orientation:
The notion that private discrimination on this basis is wrong is still
relatively fresh. This too was an aspect of Martinez that made the
case such a difficult one.
H. Six Frames, Eight Conditions
Martinez could have been framed in multiple ways, each of which
would have important effects on the outcome of the case. Some of
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these frames are less doctrinally obvious than others, but all are
plausible ways of looking at the matter under past or current
constitutional analysis. Moreover, I argue that all of them affect, if
only subliminally, the approach it takes in a conditional spending
case.
A. Frame One: State Action
The first and most fundamental frame for Martinez involves the
background principle that undergirds all constitutional liberty cases,
though in many of them it is latent. The so-called state action
doctrine holds that government action, not private action, violates the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendmento and that the Bill of Rights
speaks expressly of limits on government, not private parties. The
only Amendment that constrains private parties as well as the
government is the Thirteenth Amendment."
The difficult and abiding question, of course, is whether the
impetus for allegedly unconstitutional conduct is official versus
private. The issue is of vast significance given government's
regulatory and subsidy reach into ostensibly private domains, and
given the ways in which private entities exercise great power over
matters of public concern, often with implicit if not explicit
government support. Failure to prevent harmful private action is not,
without more, government action that triggers constitutional rights.72
But government inaction in the face of such harms is hardly
uncontroversial.
70. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The state action doctrine also limits
what Congress can do to eradicate private discrimination. The Court has held that
congressional enforcement actions under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment may
not reach beyond state action. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Some members of the Court do agree, however, that government may act to prevent
becoming a "passive participant" in private discrimination, though the contours of this
zone of permissible government action are unclear. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
72. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989)
(noting that "a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does
not constitute a violation of the [Fourteenth Amendment's] Due Process Clause").
73. The rich literature on the state action doctrine has made clear how unstable the
line is between private and government action, and how government inaction is
problematic. See, e.g., Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF
BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 57 (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 341 (1993); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471 (1923). On the complexities and
underlying incoherence of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions itself, see generally
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When government does more than stand idle, and affirmatively
supports private action-through subsidies, provision of other
benefits, or access to government property and forums-the balance
may tip toward a finding of state action. Thus, government must
avoid undue entanglement when a private actor receives government
support and contravenes public policy or engages in activities that are
inappropriate for government to undertake itself. One way in which
government may seek to dissociate from private conduct with which it
disagrees is to set conditions on funding that prevent diversion of its
funds to these disfavored ends.
There is a great irony built into the relevant cases. On the one
hand, they insist that government affirmatively detach from private
conduct that would violate the Constitution were government itself to
pursue it. On the other hand, they prevent government from making
"content-based" or otherwise discriminatory distinctions among
private actors, even when the private actors embrace and seek to
foster views and behaviors that government deems ill-advised, illegal,
or dangerous.
The collision between the two views is most visible in the First
Amendment and Equal Protection arenas, where government is
obliged to maintain access "neutrality" to its property, at least when
the property is characterized as a public or even limited public forum.
If government bars a private actor from access, then this may be a
free speech violation. But if it grants access to property that is, or
looks, "official," it may be deemed to be entangled with the private
actor in ways that allow the message or discriminatory conduct to be
attributed to government.
For example, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,74 the
Court held that a coffee shop located within a municipal parking
structure was acting with sufficient government imprimatur to
become a state actor when the restaurant lessee was "a physically and
financially integral, and, indeed, indispensable part of the
Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional
Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1195-97 (1990) (discussing the analytical
quagmire); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1984) (same); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1416 (1989) (same); Cass R.
Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (With
Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 594 (1990)
(same).
74. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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[government's] plan to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit."7
In contrast, where a private club received a state liquor license and
was required to submit its bylaws to the state as a condition of
receiving a liquor license, this was not enough to deem the private
actor's racially discriminatory policies "state action."76
More to the point of attribution, in Norwood v. Harrison," the
Court unanimously held that provision of free textbooks to a private
school that engaged in race discrimination constituted state action,
noting that the "State's constitutional obligation requires it to steer
clear, not only of operating the old dual system of racially segregated
schools, but also of giving significant aid to institutions that practice
racial or other invidious discrimination."7
This is not to say that government is legally implicated in private
discriminatory conduct simply by offering private actors funding or
assistance of other kinds. On the other side of the ledger are many
modern cases like Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, in which a private school
received over ninety percent of its funding from the state yet was not,
perforce, deemed to be a "state actor" when it fired one of its
teachers.79 To attribute the termination decision to the government
required a stronger showing of government involvement in the
specific conduct than its funding of the actor who made the decision.
The more the government seeks to control how the funding
recipient behaves, however, the easier it is to attribute the actions of
that private actor to the government. That is, the government makes
the state action argument stronger, and increases its liability exposure
by setting more specific and directive conditions on its funds. Yet as
Norwood shows, it also risks liability when it does not condition
access to its funds on compliance with nondiscrimination conditions.
The arc of the state action case law since the 1970s clearly points
against a finding of state action as a consequence of funding alone.
Rendell-Baker, not Norwood, is more reflective of the modern
Court's approach. As applied to Martinez, this means that a litigant
would be hard pressed to attribute to the university legal
responsibility for a recognized student group's decision to exclude
75. Id. at 723-24.
76. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
77. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
78. Id. at 467; see also Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1971)
(government could not give exclusive use of public recreation facilities to private schools
that discriminated on the basis of race).
79. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
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another student from its organization simply because the group
received government benefits. However, when a student group flies
the University flag, as it were, a Burton-type argument of symbiosis
between the University and RSO becomes much stronger. Provision
of space under the University's roof, funding, and use of the school
logo and name make the analogy to Burton even more apt than it first
appears.
In short, conditioning access to RSO status on compliance with a
nondiscrimination policy arguably made constitutional, not just
pedagogical, sense. Were the student group in question a white
supremacist student organization, this argument may have been more
obvious to the litigants and to the Court. Viewed in this way, the
relevant question was not whether the student organization program
constituted a "limited public forum," but whether recognized law
student groups could reasonably be viewed as sufficiently entangled
with Hastings, such that their exclusionary decisions could be deemed
to be officially sanctioned. The nature of the forum affects this
question, of course, but in a derivative way. The more open the
forum, the less likely a finding of state entanglement or endorsement
makes sense. The more strictly the government regulates the forum,
the easier it is to declare the activities within it "official." In fact,
when the activity in question is speech, at some point it becomes
"government speech" and the forum feature falls away entirely.'
When the activities are deemed to be officially sponsored and
endorsed, then the only follow-up question is whether the
government itself could exclude students from the activities on the
basis of their adherence to CLS-type tenets.
In Martinez, these issues were elided. No party argued this as a
state action case per se, and all parties apparently agreed that
"Hastings, through its RSO program, established a limited public
forum."" That is, they accepted the private nature of the student
expression at issue. Although the majority cited Norwood, it did so
for the proposition that simply because "'the Constitution may
compel toleration of private discrimination in some circumstances
80. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (noting that
"[t]he Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not
regulate government speech"); see also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550
(2005). See generally The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases: Government Speech
Doctrine-Compelled Support for Agricultural Advertising, 119 HARV. L. REv. 277, 278
(2005); The Supreme Court, 2008 Term-Leading Cases: Freedom of Speech and
Expression-Government Speech, 123 HARv. L. REv. 232,238 (2009).
81. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.12.
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does not mean that it requires state support for such
discrimination.'"" The Court did not consider the possibility that
Hastings had to attach a nondiscrimination condition on RSO status,
under the Constitution; rather, it was concerned primarily with
whether it could do so.
Let me be clear: There is little doubt that the Court would have
rejected the state action argument, had it been made cleanly. Again,
the arc of the modern case law points away from a finding of
entanglement in this case. But the Court seemed to sense that the
state action question was relevant when it hinted at the Hobson's
choice that Hastings faced, at the close of the majority opinion:
"Exclusion," Ginsburg noted, "has two sides."' She realized that the
school risked "endorsing" behavior-as a practical, if not a legal
matter-no matter which way it moved. The school was involved in a
way that it would not have been if no funding, no imprimatur, and no
conditions were involved. One might respond that the large number
and diversity of RSOs made imprimatur concerns weak, at best. Yet
the Hastings name linked to discriminatory conduct is not a trivial
matter, as the school's unwillingness to settle the dispute proves. This
also was not a pure private action case or a "street corner" discourse
case. Consequently, one frame for the case could have focused on
whose decision it was to admit only coreligionist students to CLS.
The legal answer to this question is that the membership decision
was not attributable to Hastings; correlatively, CLS was not a "state
actor" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, even as a
recognized RSO. Hastings therefore was not constitutionally
required to adopt the nondiscrimination policy. But asking the state
action question clarifies a major subterranean anxiety within the case,
even if the doctrinal answer is evident. The Hastings officials
understood that silence here might be interpreted as complicity.
They knew that no path was "neutral," or without potential
attribution consequences. Seeing this dilemma would make a justice
far more sympathetic to Hastings's decision to adopt the
nondiscrimination policy-as written or as interpreted. The
government's effort then more obviously becomes one of choosing its
message, not punishing a student group's message. A declaration that
something is not state action for purposes of the Constitution does
not end the matter "on the ground." For the parties closest to the
82. Id. at 2986 (citing Norwood, 413 U.S. at 463).
83. Id. at 2993.
issues, granting space to a private party still may look like official
endorsement, just as refusing to do so may look like official
condemnation.
Likewise, many Establishment Clause cases hinge on whether
religious speech or symbolism located on public property can likewise
be attributed to the government, versus to a private speaker.'
Government seeks to distance itself from religious messages in order
to avoid being seen as endorsing any religious viewpoint. Rather than
exclude religious actors altogether, government sometimes conditions
access to government property or resources on compliance with rules
designed to maintain the government's secular identity or to assure
that the government is not entangled in specific religion-based
decisions that government either cannot make, or wishes not to make.
For example, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court allowed state
funds to flow to private religious schools, on the condition that the
recipients not discriminate on the basis of religion in admissions
decisions." And in Locke v. Davey, the Court upheld the decision of
the State of Washington to condition access to its Promise
Scholarship Program on not using the funds to pursue a degree in
devotional theology." A different result in Martinez would have cast
doubt on whether such conditions on state funds are constitutional.
As I will explain, it also may have led to suspension of some
government programs: If government cannot set nondiscrimination
conditions it may feel compelled to withhold support altogether.
Although the Court does not analyze these religion cases under
the state action umbrella, and instead deploys the Establishment
Clause version of the "government endorsement" issue, the factual
and legal inquiries are quite similar." As applied to Martinez, the
state action issue again would be whether the religious activities of
CLS could be attributed to Hastings. If so, the Establishment Clause
problem looms large. Though again, the likely-though not
doctrinally inevitable-answer is that this was not government action
and thus not an Establishment Clause violation.
84. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
85. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
86. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
87. Indeed, some argue that the state action doctrine is a better analytical route to
follow in the religion cases, and would help to bring them into better alignment with equal
protection and free speech cases. See Developments in the Law-State Action and the
PubliclPrivate Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REv. 1248, 1280 (2010).
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B. Frame Two: Government Establishment
A second frame for analyzing Martinez is as an Establishment
Clause case. In other words, was Hastings obliged to impose the
nondiscrimination condition in order to prevent a reasonable,
educated observer from interpreting the activities of CLS as
government endorsement of religion?
The overlap between the foregoing state action analysis and the
Court's Establishment Clause analysis is significant, though usually
unacknowledged. Both lines of cases examine the context of the
private/public activity, the degree of government entanglement, the
nature of government funding or other support, the nature of
government regulation, and all other evidence of government
responsibility for the ostensibly private conduct. Both lines of cases
also reveal the Court's increasing unwillingness to find government
action, even when a private party derives substantial support from
government. Both lines of cases tend to divide the Court on
ideological grounds, with the more conservative justices favoring a
limited interpretation of government responsibility for private actors'
conduct.
The Establishment Clause cases are more ornate, however, and
have a distinctive historical, textual, and cultural cadence.
Consequently, independent analysis of the government responsibility
issue is necessary in cases that involve private actors engaged in
religious activity with government financial or other support.
Martinez fits under two strands of these Establishment Clause
cases. The first strand involves cases in which private religious
speakers seek access to government forums but are denied. Whether
the speakers have a right to such access depends on the nature of the
government forum-is it a public forum, a limited public forum, or a
nonpublic forum? It also depends on whether their presence on
government property would lead a reasonable observer to think that
the private speech was endorsed by government in impermissible
ways.
In earlier times, the Establishment Clause barrier to government
accommodation of religious speech was more formidable than it is
today. Accordingly, many government actors drafted access rules
that excluded religious activities in an effort to detach themselves
from the appearance of endorsement of religion. This is the same
problem identified above under the state action cases, where
government risked constitutional liability if it did not exclude private
discriminators from government subsidy programs, or attach
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conditions to subsidies to prevent diversion of government support to
discriminatory ends.
Yet if government overreads the risk of attribution and goes
beyond what is constitutionally required to distance itself from
private conduct, then an applicant may object that his or her
exclusion from the government program itself is "discriminatory" or
"viewpoint-specific." That is, as the government's constitutional
defense to his or her participation grows weaker, the private party's
access claim grows stronger.
The turning point in the religious speech arena was the 1981 case
of Widmar v. Vincent.' In Widmar, a student religious group sought
access to meeting room space on a public university campus. The
university officials excluded the group from this forum, on the ground
that it would violate the Establishment Clause to accommodate it.
The Court rejected this constitutional defense, thereby opening the
door to a successful equal access claim for the student group."
Post-Widmar, the Court has extended its reasoning beyond the
university context and upheld access claims more generally, including
access to school grounds after formal school hours, where elementary
level students are present." Indeed, no Establishment Clause
violation was found even when the religious activity on school
grounds included singing of hymns and uttering of prayers while
elementary level children were present.9' The key was not the content
of the speech in question; it was irrefutably religious. Rather, the key
was whether the religious speech could be attributed to the
government. The Court concluded that the speech would not be
misunderstood as government endorsement, and held that where
other groups were allowed access to the property for meetings and
discussions, religious groups could not be denied the opportunity to
meet and discuss similar themes from a religious perspective.
The proper test for this attribution inquiry, though, is contested.
Some justices-though a dwindling number-have insisted on a wall
between church and state that requires significant detachment.
Others argue that strict separationism not only is not constitutionally
88. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
89. Id. at 277.
90. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
91. Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98, 111-12.
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required; it is hostile to religion and itself unconstitutional.2 Both
sides claim to be preserving government "neutrality" vis-h-vis
religious and nonreligious ideas and speakers.'
A minority of the current justices, however, would go farther and
allow government to weigh in on the side of religion over irreligion-
though not on a particular viewpoint among religions. In their view,
strict government neutrality is not consistent with the history of
religion in the United States."
The second relevant strand of Establishment Clause cases
involves government financial assistance and other benefits for
religion. As the Court in Martinez observed, government subvention
of private activities is different from government regulation of the
same activities. In the case of religion, government financial support
divides the justices and many citizens quite sharply. But again, the
arc of the modern case law bends toward a significant easing of past
restrictions on government benefits that reach religious destinations."
The current law clearly allows support that is secular in content, that
is part of a more general program that serves a secular end, and that
passes first through private hands that in turn direct it to religious
ends."
Even direct support of sectarian entities may be constitutional
however, provided the government program is open to all who
advance the government's secular goal, and if certain conditions are
met that prevent divertibility of that secular support to religious
indoctrination. This last caveat may soon fall as well, given Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor's departure from the Court. She was willing to
assume good faith on the part of religious actors that receive
government funds and presume they would observe rules against
diversion of the funds to sectarian ends-but, notably, she did worry
about divertibility.' Her more conservative colleagues, in contrast,
would uphold government programs even if funding flows directly to
92. See Toni M. Massaro, Religious Freedom and "Accommodationist Neutrality": A
Non-Neutral Critique, 84 OR. L. Rev. 935 (2006) (outlining the internal division on the
Court).
93. Id. at 944-45.
94. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "governmental invocation of God is not an establishment").
95. See Massaro, supra note 92, at 963-64.
96. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000) (plurality opinion); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
97. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 859-61 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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sectarian institutions, and even if it is divertible, as long as the
government program itself is secular and the aid is secular in
content." If the religious entity satisfies the secular criteria for the
government program, then it should be eligible for government
funding. All signs are that Justice O'Connor's replacement on the
Court-Justice Alito-will side with this emerging account of funding
for religion conditions.
As applied to Martinez, the trends in the religion doctrine
suggest that the religious nature of the student group in question did
affect the dissenting justices, even though the case was not tried as an
Establishment Clause case. A more pervasive apprehension about
government hostility to religious actors likely influenced Justice Alito
and his dissenting colleagues. Some of them would permit the
government to be nonneutral when it comes to religion, at least at a
general and nonsectarian level. Thus, even if the activities of CLS
could have been attributed to Hastings, these justices likely would
have been relatively unconcerned, as long as no other students were
compelled to participate in the activities and all religious groups
received similar treatment.
The dissenters viewed the RSO program as secular and of
general applicability. That government money and other benefits of
the program flowed to CLS and its sectarian ends would not, in their
view, constitute an Establishment Clause problem. In fact, it would
be an outcome that offered support for an organization that embraces
ideals that deserve government respect. These justices are inclined to
treat subsidies to religion no differently than provision of a public
forum for religion. To them, money is not a special Establishment
Clause problem and does not present a special peril-as long as the
government support is directed to the secular aspect of the religious
institution or activity. Most crucially, religion is a point of view within
the universe of ideas, not a category of ideas that can be cordoned off
when other viewpoints or expression on similar topics are included.
Consequently, the exclusion of CLS students from the RSO program
not only was unnecessary; it was almost certainly viewpoint-
discriminatory, and part of a larger pattern of adverse treatment of
religion in the public sphere. Government "neutrality" is "hostility"
to religion when it is construed to mean denial of full participation in
government programs-including government subsidy programs-for
religious actors.
98. See, e.g., id. at 820-21 (plurality opinion).
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This helps to explain why the dissenting justices likely did not see
the exclusion of CLS as in any way analogous to exclusion of a white
supremacist student organization that refused to comply with the
Policy, and also why they regarded exemption of this officially
sanctioned religious group from more general nondiscrimination rules
as constitutionally required, not just permissible.' The religious
content of the student activity was, in their eyes, a positive good that
the government had the right to affirmatively support.
This also may explain the irritation that the dissent displayed
about distinguishing Healy. The Court in Healy stepped in to prevent
exclusion of a left-wing student group; yet the Court in Martinez
allowed the exclusion of the Christian student group. The difference
in treatment, Justice Alito implied, signals a difference in judicial
attitude toward the views expressed by the two student organizations,
and further evidences judicial hostility to religion in particular. In his
view, this is upside down: Religion is entitled to special solicitude, not
special suspicion.
The justices who still view the separation of church and state as
the best way to protect religious freedom, of course, see the matter
quite differently. Their doubts about the Court's steady erosion of
more robust Establishment Clause restrictions on government in
general make them leerier of government endorsement problems
than their colleagues are. They are more likely to view an "access-
subject-to-nondiscrimination-condition" as a sensible way to juggle
the now-mandated access of religious groups to limited public forums,
with the government's desire to preserve its secular identity. In fact,
they might consider such conditions to be especially critical when
religious actors seek access. In short, SDS and CLS are not equally
situated; only the latter group raises the specter of an Establishment
Clause concern, if not a violation.
These justices become even more anxious about the recent
erosion of Establishment Clause barriers when subsidies, not just
forum access claims, are involved. The majority in Martinez likely
understood that had it not upheld Hastings's decision to deny CLS's
request for exemption, the case would have been cited as support for
the view that similar exemptions from nondiscrimination conditions
on government funding must be granted in other contexts as well.
99. There is one significant caveat to this observation. Where a law is of general,
neutral application, Justice Scalia does not think that the Free Exercise Clause entitles a
religious actor to an exemption. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Justice Stevens in particular seemed to grasp this concept, and even
Justice Alito seemed to sense it when he downplayed the funding
feature of the decision.
All of the justices, including Justice Ginsburg, are quite
sympathetic to exemption claims in contexts where exemptions
promote religious autonomy without directly undermining the rights
of others." The so-called liberal wing is more skeptical of such
claims, however, where the parties seek benefits minus a
nondiscrimination condition that affects other citizens directly. In the
latter scenario, the requests feel less like a demand for equal access or
religious autonomy than a demand for special treatment that has the
potential to wound others, with government support.m Special
treatment here may enable others to sidestep equality mandates,
which may undermine hard-won civil rights advances because nothing
in the case law thus far offers a logical way to restrict special
exemption treatment to religious actors alone. The cases involve the
mantra of "neutral" treatment of ideas and expressive association.
Religion often may be a compelling basis for an expressive autonomy
exemption from general rules, but other associations that embrace
discriminatory tenets also should qualify.
Finally, cases like Martinez touch on the acutely sensitive area of
sexual orientation, where religious conservatives are most agitated
about nondiscrimination mandates that intrude directly into their
religious principles and practices, insofar as some religionists regard
homosexuality as sinful or otherwise inconsistent with religious
tenets. They now are countered by others who regard discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation as irrational in some contexts, if not
all.'m The former group strongly favors exemptions for religious
100. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); cf Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709 (2005) (unanimously upholding a federal law that allowed for exemptions from
general rules where they impose a significant burden on institutionalized religious
persons).
101. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
102. See, e.g., Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010)
(striking down section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act as applied to same-sex couples,
on the grounds that it was irrational); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009)
(holding refusal to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated Iowa Constitution
because it lacked a legitimate state purpose). The issue of whether such discrimination is
"irrational" also is central to the Proposition 8 litigation in California. See Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). See generally Toni M. Massaro,
Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45 (1996) (arguing for a rational basis
approach to constitutional challenges of laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation).
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actors in order to restore "neutrality" and preserve equality for
religious peoples; the latter favors newer civil rights laws that prohibit
such discrimination to achieve "neutrality," and regard exemptions
from these laws as hostile to equality, not religion. There is no
obvious bridge between these dramatically opposing viewpoints.
Although the case law leans heavily against groups that insist on
a constitutional right to exemption from nondiscrimination conditions
on government benefits, the seeds for these adventuresome claims
already have been sown. Indeed, this may be the most important
reason why Martinez was such a hard case for the Court to resolve.
The first important doctrinal piece of the CLS argument was the
Court's holding that denying equal access to funding is
unconstitutional where the denial can be characterized as "viewpoint-
sensitive.",o Once this step was taken, the exclusion of religious
groups from funding became much harder to characterize as respect
for religious pluralism or a legitimate exercise of government funding
discretion. Instead, it looks more like an unconstitutional condition.
Moreover, statutory measures like the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 lend legal and political force to
claims for religion-based exclusions from general rules in particular."
That the Constitution no longer prohibits such solicitude for religious
actors opens the door to once incomprehensible, but now quite
plausible, claims that the Constitution requires such solicitude.05
In sum, none of the justices viewed the authorized presence of
CLS as an Establishment Clause issue for Hastings. This is because
the Clause has been construed in recent years to be a mere shadow of
its former self. But the underlying tension between the older, strict
separationist and the newer accommodationist accounts of the Clause
likely has residual effects on the permissible contours of conditions on
participation of religious speakers and actors, as does the residual
tension between older state action cases and modern case law that
construes state action much more narrowly.
It seems fair to say that the more one worries about the
entwinement of church and state, the more sympathetic one will be to
103. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(requiring the University of Virginia to fund a campus religious magazine on equal terms
with subsidization of other student publications).
104. 42 U.S.C. §H 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2-2000bb-3
(1994)). The Court upheld this measure against a facial challenge in Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709 (2005).
105. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719.
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nondiscrimination conditions on access and funding. Likewise, the
more one worries about the entanglement of government with private
discrimination, the more one will favor nondiscrimination conditions
on access and funding. Don't like the nondiscrimination conditions?
Then don't take the money, and find another place to congregate.
This may sound harsh (it is harsh), but so is allowing government to
buoy actors who advance decidedly unequal, illiberal ends without
requiring that they observe common norms. Liberating these actors
from common rules is not necessarily a liberal or libertarian good. It
depends, of course, on what they are doing with the government
support. Allowing government to condition access to its support on
common norms likewise is not necessarily a liberal or libertarian
good. It depends on the conditions that government imposes.
The matter, though, should not be viewed exclusively from the
perspective of the private party constrained by the condition. One
also must consider how that private party constrains others. The
doctrinal assumption that only the government can violate
constitutional rights-and only when it acts affirmatively-never has
persuaded everyone, particularly when the private party engages in
race- or caste-based discrimination, or when the private party is
engaged in explicitly sectarian activities. The state action and
Establishment Clause cases remind us of this abiding concern about
government participation in private affairs and offer important insight
into the Hastings decision to impose its nondiscrimination claims.
C. Frame Three: Government Speech
As indicated above, the more the government asserts control
over the content of a funded program or private speaker, the more it
becomes responsible for the conduct and content producedi? At
some point, the government "owns" the message. Once again, the
key issue for the government is attribution. In fact, the so-called
government speech doctrine is best understood as a freedom of
speech riff on the more general state action theme identified above.
The most recent case to address this issue in the context of
freedom of expression was Pleasant Grove City v. Summum.un In
106. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). A related issue, though one not
implicated by the facts of Martinez, is whether government property is not dedicated to
private expressive purposes at all, or is a "forum" of some kind-public, designated,
limited-as to which some private actors have some claim of access. All of the parties
agreed that the RSO program anticipated some access by private student actors.
107. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
598 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 38:3
CLS V. MARTINEZ: SIX FRAMES
Summum, a religious group requested permission to place a
monument bearing its "Seven Aphorisms" in a public park, where
other monuments already were erected.'" The Court upheld the
city's refusal to grant this permission, on the ground that the
permanent monuments in the park were a "form of government
speech."'" This characterization of the monuments was dispositive of
the freedom of speech access claim: "[T]he government may adopt
whatever message it chooses-subject, of course, to other
constitutional constraints, such as those embodied in the
Establishment Clause-and need not alter its speech to accommodate
the views of private parties.,,o
This is one end of the wide spectrum of speech on government
property. On the other end is a private speaker in a quintessential
public forum, who is free to express even heretical or seditionist
political views, short of an imminent disruption or other illegal act.
and subject to reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions.112
Martinez fell into the grey zone between these First Amendment
poles, and was not easily charted. It is clear that none of the justices
regarded the speech of CLS as "government speech" for purposes of
First Amendment analysis-for many of the same reasons why they
did not see a significant "state action" or Establishment Clause
problem. Less clear is why the justices do not analyze these three
ways of framing a condition on funding or access case-state action,
Establishment Clause, government speech-together, given their
substantial analytical and factual overlap. In any event, all three
frames point in the same direction-here, and in most other cases. In
the case of Martinez, these conclusions were: No state action, no
establishment, and no government speech.
But older case law-which has not been overruled-suggests that
these conclusions were not inevitable. These backdrop cases cast
shadows over the modern doctrine, just as older Commerce Clause,
economic substantive due process, and Tenth Amendment cases still
hover over other regions of constitutional law doctrine. In the right
108. Id. at 1130.
109. Id. at 1129.
110. Id.
111. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447-81 (1969).
112. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719, 725-26 (2000); Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288,
293 (1984); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
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case, in the right context, with the right Court composition, the
thinking that governs in these older, recessive cases can become
dominant-if only implicitly-and outcomes in close cases can shift in
ways that do not require overruling any case outright. In other words,
nagging doubts about relieving the government of constitutional
responsibility for so much private discrimination, and about allowing
quite significant government involvement in religion, may cause some
justices to uphold modern nondiscrimination conditions on
government funds and favors. It also may cause conscientious
government actors to take affirmative steps to distance themselves
from private speech or conduct, even when the law does not require
them to do so.
So it may have been here.
D. Frame Four: Government 'Play in the Joints'
Private speech or conduct can become government speech or
conduct-the problem identified in the foregoing three frames. Yet,
private speech or conduct often can be accommodated by
government, without substantial risk of attribution to the
government, given the Court's narrow construction of "state action"
within the above three frames. This wide zone may be described as
the "play in the joints" zone, where government need not, but often
does, allow private access to its property or resources.
The shrinking of the first foregoing frames expands this
government policy elbow room. Likewise, the shrinking of Frames
Five and Six-which define limits on government power to exclude
private parties from its programs-expands the zone of government
discretion. Both moves allow government to make access decisions
without worrying unduly about a colorable constitutional claim. The
middle ground is determined by the Court's definition of the scope of
the surrounding territory.
In Martinez, the majority located the Hastings RSO policy in the
middle ground. Government could create the RSO student program
in question, but it did not have to do so. Government could condition
access on compliance with a nondiscrimination condition, but it did
not have to do so. It could draft an "all-comers" nondiscrimination
condition, but it did not have to do so. It could have exempted
religious groups (and, presumably, other affinity groups that satisfied
similar conditions with respect to the burden on their expressive
association autonomy) from an "all-comers" nondiscrimination
condition, but it did not have to do so.
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In short, accommodating the dissenting student groups would not
have been impermissible endorsement of their ends/views, and failure
to accommodate the dissenting student groups was not impermissible
discrimination against their ends/views. How to navigate between
these options was a matter of government discretion, not a
constitutional imperative.
What hinges on the Court's definition of this "play in the joints?"
An enormous amount, given the staggering array of contexts in which
the government manages property, programs, and resources with the
presence and participation of private parties. To argue that
government's managerial discretion over these contexts should be
superintended by the courts is to put the proverbial camel's nose
under a stupendously large tent. But the sheer scope of government
provenance also suggests that to deny judicial scrutiny in favor of
broad government discretion is to banish meaningful constitutional
rights from vast common territory.
To take but a few examples, the government employs at least 11
million of the nation's workers,"' a figure that is obscured by the
number of private businesses that work on government contracts and
are not included in this statistic.114  Over 49 million American
schoolchildren attend K-12 public schools."' Government support of
private schools, in the form of vouchers and other grants, has
ballooned.H1 6  Likewise, government financial and tax-exemption
support for private entities, including "faith-based" organizations, is
fairly commonplace."' Government bailouts of private corporations
and financial institutions during the current economic crisis have
made distinctions between "government" and "private" business-
113. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CURRENT
EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS HIGHLIGHTS, JUNE 2010 (July 2, 2010), http://www.bls.gov/ces/
highlights062010.pdf.
114. PAUL C. LIGHT, CTR. FOR PUB. SERV., THE BROOKINGS INST., FACT SHEET ON
THE NEW TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT (Sept. 3, 2003), http://www.brookings.edu/-/
media/Files/rc/articles/2003/0905politics_1ight/light2003O9O5.pdf.
115. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS (2009), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_034.asp.
116. The Court's decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002), gave
the constitutional go-ahead to properly crafted voucher programs. The door opened
before Zelman, however, in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 815-25 (2000) (plurality
opinion), and Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-351 (1997).
117. See OFFICE OF FAITH-BASED & NEIGHBORHOOD P'SHIPS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, ABOUT US, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ofbnp/about/council
(last visited July 19, 2010).
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long a nettlesome issue of state action" 8-even more obscure. And
privatization of so-called government activities also has increased in
many domains, including criminal punishment and military warfare,
further muddying the line between public and private activity.'19 In all
of these contexts, private and public actors are enmeshed with one
another. In some, there is no doubt that the government is the
primary engine; "state action" clearly is satisfied. But in many more
of them-and within some of them-a finding of state action is very
unlikely under current doctrine.
Nevertheless, Charles Black is (still) right: "[T]he 'state action'
problem is the most important problem in American law,"'20 which is
why the state action doctrine continues to excite considerable
scholarly interest.121 It matters enormously to constitutional liberty
whether a matter that falls within the vast domain of government
authority and potential responsibility is deemed to be governmental
or private. It likewise matters enormously whether the government
has significant or scant "play in the joints" regulatory power, within
these vast domains.
But the most important question is not whether a particular
government program or policy that affects private actors constitutes
"state action" per se; at some level, it surely is state action and the
government often is a co-creator of the outcome in question in some
sense. Critics of the state action doctrine have made this case so
convincingly that no thoughtful person can deny the force of the
claim that the line between private and public often is a chimera. The
important legal question is whether government action or inaction is
118. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations of Corporate Activity-
Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L.
REV. 933 (1952); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 151
(2008); Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and State, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2353
(2007); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1367 (2003).
See generally John C. Harrison & Lillian Riemer BeVier, The State Action Principle and
Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
119. See GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACr: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE
PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS (1989); PAUL R. VERKUIL,
OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS
THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (2007); Sharon Dolovich,
State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437 (2005); Metzger, supra note 118.
120. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: 'State Action,'
Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69 (1967).
121. See supra notes 72, 86, 117-18.
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sufficiently directive of a private party, such that the specific conduct
in question is attributable to the government: In other words, who is
the proximate and primary decision maker-in fact, and by all
reasonable appearances-with respect to the specific conduct in
question? (The important practical question is: What are the real
world consequences of allowing the conduct to continue, even if it is
not legally attributable to the government?)
The fact is that government has significant control over how this
legal issue is resolved, because it so rarely is required in the first place
to create a program or policy. Government need not run schools,
operate workplaces, grant tax exemptions, fund private organizations,
open its land to speakers (apart from the sliver of fora that are
"traditional" public fora), or bail out struggling private concerns.
When it does, it has considerable power ab initio to define the things
it chooses to do and the conditions of private participation. The more
the government sets up specific, unambiguous, program-relevant,
proportional, detailed, and evenly applied conditions from the start,
the more likely the specific outcomes of that program are its own-its
"action." Correlatively, the less likely it is that a private participant in
the program can claim that these conditions are "unreasonable" or
''coercive," at least when the conditions only constrain the private
party while he or she is "on the (government) job or dime." The
private actor had a choice (at least in theory) about participation, and
was on notice of the conditions from the beginning.
More fundamentally, the government can take its very big ball
and go home, if courts intervene and second-guess government
decisions about the program conditions. Government can close the
forum, terminate the funding, shutter the schools. Only rarely has the
Court held that such a "cut off your nose to spite your face" response
triggers constitutional liability.'22
In some cases, of course, the government is not likely to cut the
activity in question-privatization is practically infeasible or
politically impossible. As applied to Martinez, though, this was not a
far-fetched possibility. If Hastings could only run the RSO program if
it permitted exemptions from the nondiscrimination policy that
allowed exclusion of students based on status or belief, then Hastings
may have discontinued the RSO program and let all student groups
122. See Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding it was unconstitutional
for school system to close rather than comply with a desegregation order); but see Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (holding that Jackson, Mississippi, could surrender its
public swimming pools rather than attempt to run them on a desegregated basis).
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seek access as private organizations. In other contexts, one can
imagine similar responses.
If the government cannot impose "decency" restrictions on
funding for the arts,'23 it might be inclined to discontinue such finding.
If it cannot limit the use of government funded computers in ways
that prevent children from viewing adult material, it may rethink the
funding program itself.'24 If a school library has no editorial control
over the content of a section of its collection, then it may choose to
eliminate that category of the collection altogether.'25 If a high school
is required to grant access to all student extracurricular organizations,
including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender ("LGBT") groups, it
may cease to grant access to any of them.'26 If the government cannot
condition access to Title X money on compliance with a condition
that prohibits counseling or referral for abortion as a method of
family planning,'27 it may cease Title X funding altogether. And if the
government cannot condition access to major grants on compelling
recipients to grant access to military recruiters," it may well sweep
such grants from the table.
Of course, government makes policy decisions for multiple
reasons: The risk of constitutional liability is only one of them. And
the casual assumption that government actors who design
government programs do not care about the liberties of applicants for
government grants, of speakers seeking access to government fora, of
public library patrons, or of public school students and public sector
employees during the school day or work week is simply wrong. In
the last two scenarios in particular, anybody close to the ground
knows how hard many teachers, administrators, and employers work
to respect public school students' and public sector employees'
expressive and other autonomy. The partisan divisions among
Americans about hot button issues like religion, sexually explicit
expression, abortion, security versus liberty, gays in the military, or
123. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998).
124. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality opinion).
125. Island Trees Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-72 (1982) (plurality opinion).
126. See, e.g., Mark Walsh, Gay Students' Request Spurs Board to Cut Clubs, EDUC.
WEEK (Feb. 28, 1996), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1996/02/28/23gay.hl5.html
(reporting that a Salt Lake City school board voted to eliminate all extracurricular clubs
rather than allow formation of a high school gay student support group).
127. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
128. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59
(2006).
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affirmative action all can skew the public's impression of whether
government ever can be trusted to set access conditions in a sensible,
liberty protective, and even-handed way.
Moreover, the level and location of government actor-as well as
regional, local, and individual variations-may have a big impact on
how access conditions on public resources or government programs
are crafted, and with what concerns in mind. For example, whether a
public school or local library contains a comprehensive collection on
human sexuality often depends more on the First Amendment and
other sensibilities of the librarian in charge of acquisitions than on
any other variable. Likewise, how a public school's RSO policy
actually is implemented may depend more on the associate or
assistant dean in charge of enforcing the policy, than on any higher
level official. And all of this may depend on another elusive factor:
Whether any official is paying attention to the strict letter of often
complex government policies, or monitoring whether recipients of
government resources adhere to upfront conditions.12 9
129. The dissent in Martinez made much of the former dean's deposition, in which she
stated that the Hastings policy was an "all-comers" policy. 130 S. Ct. at 3001 (Alito, J.,
dissenting). Justice Alito was deeply skeptical of this statement, and argues that the
change in interpretation was a "pretext" for discrimination against the religious student
group. Id.
A much simpler explanation, though, might be that the former dean was not focused on
the details of this policy-as it applied to any student organization-until CLS initiated its
nationally orchestrated test of similar policies nationwide. That is, the national CLS
organization called the question here, not the Hastings students or Hastings itself. It likely
did so in order to make a larger point about the right of religious actors to seek
exemptions from generally applicable nondiscrimination rules, rather than because of a
pattern of actual invidious, enforced exclusion of its student chapters from university
programs or forums.
RSOs-at Hastings and elsewhere-likely conduct their activities without much
supervision by campus officials to assure that they are complying with every jot and title of
the applicable campus or organization regulations. Once the litigation gong was struck, of
course, the former dean and Hastings had to look closely at the policy, as written, as
applied, and as a matter of school authority in future, related matters.
The Hastings CLS students themselves may have preferred to keep things as they were
before the national organization ginned up this campaign to demand access-plus-
exemption on campuses. Some of them may have had no idea that they were, in essence,
required by national CLS regulations to exclude fellow students who disagreed with the
tenets, assuming any students with dissenting views sought to join. Others may have
assumed that they could reserve membership to fellow believers. None may have wanted
to stir up this tempest, but may have felt compelled to honor CLS's national rules in order
to preserve their connection to the organization, and to respect its associational autonomy.
And once the question was called, the Hastings chapter of Outlaw (a student group
concerned with gay rights) may have felt compelled to step up and protest. Although the
CLS policy did not exclude gays alone, it made clear that unrepentant homosexuality was
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Yet the range of government activity that the Court would have
to monitor if conditions on government benefits and fora trigger strict
judicial scrutiny is very broad indeed. Like Hastings, the Court thus
was caught in its own cross fire-but at a higher level. If it sided with
Hastings, it would appear to side against CLS. But if it did not side
with Hastings, it not only would appear to side with a group whose
identity required it to exclude others based on belief or status; it also
would set new expressive association limits on this government "play
in the joints" authority.
Nearly every time the Court approaches this particular
constitutional cliff, it balks. Seeing this helps to put Martinez into
proper perspective.
True, the public school child does not "shed [her] constitutional
rights ... at the school house gate."" But the public school can
discipline students for using sexual metaphors at an official school
assembly,'3' or for holding up a sign that reads: "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" at
an off-campus, school-approved activity that occurred during school
hours.132  The Court repeatedly has deferred to educators, lest it
become a "super school board""' that oversees daily school decision-
making authority.'34
True, a public school teacher has a constitutional right to free
speech.'3' For example, she cannot be fired for failure to take an oath
not to advocate the unlawful overthrow of the government, unless the
teacher is an active member in such an organization, has actual
knowledge of its illegal ends, and has a specific intent to further those
ends."' But she also cannot speak without reprisal when the speech is
a basis for exclusion. At that point, Hastings was caught in multiple cross fire, as Justice
Ginsburg noted. And no one involved-CLS, Hastings, or Outlaw-could be conciliatory
without risking important aspects of their organizational or institutional identity.
130. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
131. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986).
132. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401-03 (2007).
133. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (noting that
"the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers,
and state and local school officials, not federal judges"); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (noting that the "[Michigan] Law School's educational judgment
that ... diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer").
134. For a general review of the constitutional rights of students in public schools, see
Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating Student Speech: Suppression Versus Punishment, 85
IND. L.J. 1113 (2010).
135. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,568 (1968).
136. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606-10 (1967).
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about a personnel issue internal to the workplace,"' does not involve
a matter of "public concern,"'" is a statement "pursuant to . . . official
,,139duties, or where the speech may cause a disruption of the
workplace." In any of these cases, the teacher can be disciplined or
even fired.
True, the government does not have unlimited discretion in
setting conditions on funding or in crafting its programs.14 But a
government "'decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental
right does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict
scrutiny."'
I am not defending or critiquing any of this doctrine here.14
Rather, I am underscoring that whenever the Court applies the
Constitution to a zone of government control other than a true public
forum, it typically defers to government policy-making power to
impose conditions on its benefits and other government-sponsored
activities, in ways that make Martinez relatively unsurprising. In fact,
it does so even in "stick" cases-not just in "carrot" cases. And this is
true even when the context is education, the activity is expressive, and
the burdens are significant.'"
The reason for this is a prosaic one: Courts simply are not
equipped to superintend these day-to-day government decisions. The
137. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1983); see also Toni M. Massaro,
Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1(1987).
138. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004); Massaro, supra note 137.
139. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). The Court suggested, however,
that this test may not apply where the speech is related to academic expression or
classroom instruction. Id. at 425.
140. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
141. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987) (describing limits on
congressional purse strings power); see also infra text accompanying notes 164-98.
142. See, e.g., Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (2009) (quoting
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983)).
143. Though I have done both in other works. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 137
(critiquing the Court's approach to public employee speech).
144. It is worth noting here that unlike disappointed plaintiffs in many other cases, the
CLS students were not faced with termination, expulsion, loss of unemployment benefits,
or discipline of any kind. Nor were they officially silenced while on government property,
or banished from school grounds. They also reserved more expressive power to reach
their intended audience than did a rival union in the case of Perry Education Association
v. Perry Local Educators' Association, 460 U.S. 37, 46-48 (1983), They did lose RSO
status and benefits, which-as explained in the following sections-is enough to trigger
constitutional scrutiny in some "carrot" cases, but is rarely enough to prevail.
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sheer number of them makes this inevitable-just as it makes judicial
nonintervention so worrisome.
The cases in which the Court has intervened and disrupted
government policy-making power are the doctrinal outliers. In recent
years, the winners in many of the outlier cases have been religious
actors. It is the outlier cases that involve religious actors-not the
more general landscape of permissible conditions on government
funding and fora-that made the outcome in Martinez difficult to
predict. It is to these cases, which were the primary focus of the
parties in Martinez, that we now turn.
E. Frame Five: Mandatory Access
The government rarely is required to grant access to its property,
resources, or programs, apart from "true" public fora-i.e., places the
government has historically or by designation opened to full First
Amendment activity. Moreover, a public forum is not created by
inaction.14'
As stated above," government has significant control over the
contours of its programs, whether private parties can be participants,
and the conditions on private participation, if any. Constitutionally
defensible conditions on private participation include the following:
* Specific and unambiguous;
* Program-relevant;
* Proportional in scope and burden;
* Evenly applied as to similarly situated applicants for
participation;
* Limited to the substantive, spatial, and time parameters of
the program or other benefit;
* Tied to legitimate government goals-in actual purpose,
stated justification, and practical effect;
* Reasonably necessary to further those legitimate goals;
* Reasonably necessary to preserve government
independence from private expression or conduct.
In other words, the conditions must observe basic notions of
procedural due process, a rational basis threshold of equal protection,
and a thin, rational basis threshold of substantive due process. They
145. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992).
146. See supra notes 129-41 and accompanying text.
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clearly may promote the government's legitimate interest in
preserving its own expressive independence-i.e., to avoid the
appearance of government imprimatur on private ideas or conduct.
Although in speech cases, the Court conducts a "forum" analysis
to determine the constitutionality of conditions on access, there
actually is no practical difference between this analysis and this more
general set of "conditions on conditions" applied in other contexts.
If, for example, a public university sets up a program for student
organizations to engage in speech, it may set the parameters of the
program, define the participants, and otherwise set the conditions for
participation. If the university satisfies the criteria above in crafting
these conditions, then the program likely will be upheld. The real key
is, I submit, whether the program meets these general criteria, not
whether the program is labeled a "limited" or "nonpublic" forum, or
even whether it is deemed to be "government speech." Indeed, the
above series of factors would be a much better, and clearer, way of
analyzing the factors that drive the forum cases and that influence
whether conditions on access pass constitutional muster, than the
Court's analytically unsatisfying forum tests.
Likewise, if the government sets up a grant program for private
applicants, it may set the parameters of the grants program, define the
participants, and otherwise set the conditions for private
participation. The same list of factors will determine whether the
grant program conditions pass constitutional muster. In short, the
forum and funding cases present essentially the same issues, and
should be analyzed under the same eight criteria.
A sampling of significant forum and funding cases illustrates this
point quite nicely.
1. Forum Cases
i. Widmar v. Vincentl47
In Widmar, the University of Missouri at Kansas City, a public
university, opened its facilities for the activities of RSOs.'m A
registered student religious organization that had previously received
permission to meet on campus was informed that it no longer could
meet there because of a rule that prohibited the use of University
buildings and grounds "for the purposes of religious worship or
147. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
148. Id. at 265.
609Spring 2011]1 CLS V. MARTINEZ: SIX FRAMES
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
religious teaching."'49 The Court held that this was a content-specific
condition on access to a forum generally open for use by student
groups, which triggered strict scrutiny. The University's desire to
achieve greater separation of church and state than the Establishment
Clause required was not a sufficiently compelling reason to exclude
the student religious group.so
ii. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,5'
In Lamb's Chapel, a New York law authorized public schools to
regulate the after school use of facilities and property.152 A school
prohibited the use of its property by any religious group, and refused
repeated requests by Lamb's Chapel for permission to use school
property after hours to show a religious-oriented film series on family
values and child rearing.'3 A unanimous Court held that this was an
impermissible restriction on use of a government forum.'54 The school
could restrict access to certain speakers and certain subjects, but it
could not impose speaker-based restrictions within those parameters
that were unreasonable or viewpoint specific."' Other speakers were
allowed access to address the same themes but from a secular
perspective."' To restrict the religious groups from equal access
violated their freedom of expression."
iii. Healy v. James"s'
In Healy, a public college denied recognition as a registered
student organization to a local chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society ("SDS").'" Recognition would have included the right to use
campus facilities for meetings and use of the campus bulletin board
and school newspaper.'" The president of the college refused to grant
recognition to the chapter, because he was not satisfied it was
149. Id.
150. Id. at 270-74.
151. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
152. Id. at 389-90.
153. Id. at 388-89.
154. Id. at 392-93.
155. Id. at 393-94.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
159. Id. at 172-76.
160. Id. at 176.
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sufficiently independent of the national SDS organization, which had
a philosophy of disruption and violence in conflict with the college's
declaration of student rights. The Court concluded that insofar as the
denial of recognition was based on an assumed relationship with the
national SDS, on an unsupported fear of disruption, or on
disagreement with the group's philosophy, it was improper.
However, if the group refused to comply with a rule that required it
to abide by reasonable campus rules, this would have been a proper
basis for nonrecognition.162 The record, however, was not clear on
whether there was such a rule and if the group was willing to abide by
it. The case thus was reversed and remanded.'63
2. Funding Cases
i. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia'
In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia refused to provide
funding from a student activities fund to help subsidize the costs of
Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective, on the ground that it "primarily
promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an
ultimate reality."'6  The Court held that the University denied the
student staff of the publication their First Amendment rights, because
it had promoted other student publications. To deny only this
publication University support, because of its religious perspective,
was viewpoint discrimination.
ii. Rust v. Sullivan6
In Rust, the Court reviewed the federal Public Health Service
Act, which specified that none of the federal funds appropriated
under Title X of the Act could be used "in programs where abortion
is a method of family planning."'6 The Act was further amended to
prohibit Title X projects from engaging in counseling concerning,
referrals for, and activities advocating abortion as a method of family
161. Id. at 188.
162. Id. at 188-89.
163. Id. at 194.
164. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
165. Id. at 822-23.
166. Id. at 830-32.
167. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
168. Id. at 178.
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planning. Title X grantees and doctors who supervise Title X funds
challenged the regulations on First Amendment grounds. The Court
held that these conditions on funding were constitutional on a facial
challenge, because they assured that the program funds would be
used for the designated purposes, and helped avoid the appearance of
government support for abortion-related activities.' In response to
the argument that the regulations were "viewpoint-specific," the
Court noted that the government can make a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion, and can implement that judgment by
allocation of its funds.o The regulations did not require recipients to
give up abortion-related speech; they merely required that such
activities be kept separate from Title X funded programs."
iii. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley7 2
In Finley, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the
National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities Act's vesting of
the National Endowment for the Arts ("NEA") with substantial
discretion over the distribution of grant money for the arts. The
funding priorities included works of "artistic and cultural
significance" with emphasis on "creativity and cultural diversity,"
"professional excellence," and "public ... education ... and
appreciation of the arts."7 3 The criteria later were amended, after an
outcry over controversial-allegedly blasphemous-works, to require
that the grant makers take into account "general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public."74 In a facial challenge to the Act, the Court held that the Act
did not pose a substantial risk that it would lead to the suppression of
freedom of expression. "Decency and respect" were two of several
conditions on grants, and the amendment adding these criteria was a
"bipartisan proposal introduced as a counterweight to amendments
that would have eliminated NEA's funding or substantially
constrained its grant-making authority."'7  The limited resources for
arts grant funding requires the exercise of judgment, and although the
First Amendment applies in the subsidy context, "Congress has wide
169. Id. at 188.
170. Id. at 193.
171. Id. at 193-94.
172. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
173. Id. at 573.
174. Id. at 576.
175. Id. at 581.
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latitude to set spending priorities."'76 At least at the stage of a facial
challenge, the Court was unwilling to assume that the criteria would
be applied in a way that suppressed disfavored viewpoints. 77
iv. Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez 78
In Velazquez, the Court addressed the federal Legal Services
Corporation Act, which authorized grantee organizations to provide
free legal assistance to indigent clients with respect to welfare benefits
claims, but prohibited recipients from representing clients in an effort
to amend or challenge existing welfare law."'7 The Court held that the
condition was an unconstitutional restriction on recipients' freedom
of expression, and distinguished Rust on the ground that Rust
involved "government speech."'" Velazquez, in contrast, involved
funding for private speech, as well as the independence of the judicial
system.' According to the Court, the restriction on attorney speech
"distorted the usual functioning" of the funded medium of
communication'" and thus was a substantial restriction on that
expression. The Court further noted that cases involving a limited
forum, though not controlling, "provide some instruction" for
evaluating restrictions in governmental subsidies.'
v. United States v. American Library Association'"
In American Library, a plurality of the Court upheld federal
grant programs that required public library recipients to install
filtering programs to block obscene or pornographic images and
prevent minors from accessing inappropriate materials.' The First
Amendment rights of adult library patrons were not abridged, given
that the filters could be disabled upon request, and because the
government has "broad discretion to make content-based judgments
in deciding what private speech to make available to the public."'8
176. Id. at 587-88.
177. Id. at 587.
178. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
179. Id. at 538.
180. Id. at 541-42.
181. Id. at 542-43.
182. Id. at 543.
183. Id. at 544.
184. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
185. Id. at 199-201.
186. Id. at 194-95.
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As in Rust, the government here is merely assuring that "public funds
be spent for the purpose for which they are authorized.""" A library
is not a true "public forum," and collection content decisions by
public librarians are not subject to heightened scrutiny." Rather, the
government here may determine the content of the materials it
provides to the public without close judicial oversight.
vi. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights'"
In Rumsfeld, a unanimous Court upheld the Solomon Act, which
withholds certain federal funds from colleges and universities that
restrict the access of military recruiters to students on campus.'-
According to the Court, the funding condition restricted conduct, not
speech, and in no way interfered with a recipient's ability to express
its disagreement with the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
regarding service by gay men and women in the military.'91 Indeed,
the Court suggested that Congress could have imposed the campus
military recruitment access rule directly on colleges and universities,
as a "stick"; thus it surely had power to impose this requirement as a
"carrot" condition on federal funding."
vii. Locke v. Davey 9'
In Davey, the Court upheld the Washington State Promise
Scholarship Program, which prohibited scholarship recipients from
using the award to pursue a devotional theology degree. 194 The
majority concluded that the condition on the scholarship award was a
legitimate exercise of "play in the joints" discretion by the State of
Washington. The state here did not discriminate against religion or
unduly burden free exercise of religion; it merely chose not to fund a
distinct category of instruction.19' Students could still pursue
devotional study, and could otherwise freely practice their religion.
There was no evidence of animus against religion, and although the
state could have included devotional study majors in the scholarship
187. Id. at 211.
18& Id. at 204-05.
189. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
190. Id. at 55-56.
191. Id. at 57.
192. Id. at 60.
193. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
194. Id. at 715.
195. Id. at 720-21.
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ambit, it was not required to do so.'" The state's antiestablishment
interests were a sufficient reason for this policy, even if federal
antiestablishment principles were not as strict.'" Finally, the state
constitution could explicitly prohibit state money from going to
religious instruction without violating the federal free exercise rights
of its citizens.198
3. Reconciling the Access Cases
Whether the outcomes in the above illustrative cases can be
reconciled is much debated. Most observers-myself included99-
think they cannot be reconciled. There is no compelling reason, for
example, why the program in Rust was "government speech" and the
program in Velazquez was not. Nor is it clear why the "forum" in
Widmar, was a "public" one-as the case implies-and not a "limited
public forum"-though this likely was because the Court had not yet
embraced this unfortunate and unhelpful terminology.
Even if a forum is a "limited public forum," it is not obvious why
excluding the topic of "religion" is "viewpoint" versus "subject
matter" discrimination. Nor is it clear why editorial discretion was a
legitimate reason to defer to the government conditions on computer
grants imposed in American Library, given the infinity of the internet
versus the zero-sum space limits of a hard copy book collection.
It is also not clear when a case will be categorized as a "subsidy"
case versus a "forum" case: When a public school provides funding
for authorized student groups to engage in activities that include
publications but excludes religious expression, it surely is both. When
government provides funding for authorized grantees to deliver
family planning advice but excludes advice about abortion, it likewise
would seem to be both as well. Why are the latter restrictions not
"viewpoint discrimination" when the former are?
This internal incoherence is why folks can cry "foul" when a
condition on access-forum or funding-goes against them. There is
no generally accepted principle for determining when a particular
case will fall on one side of the line versus the other-especially given
the more recent cases like Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel.
196. Id. at 718-19.
197. Id. at 722-23.
198. Id. at 723-24.
199. See Massaro, supra note 92, at 980-82 (outlining the logical inconsistencies
between Locke v. Davey and cases like Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia).
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Nevertheless, an honest appraisal of the full stable of decisions
suggests that a disappointed applicant should not be surprised, let
alone outraged, when an adverse decision involves both government
funding and a credible case for government attribution. In these cases,
the government almost always wins. The more remote the
government's thumb print is from the funded activity, however, and
the more the program in question was specifically designed to foster
private expression with few content-based restrictions, the more
likely it becomes that a court will consider seriously a challenge to an
access restriction. By definition, and by American tradition, the
attribution claim is weakest when the government benefit is a true
forum-that is, a space that government clearly designates as
available for speech that is not government's own. Whether this
space is cordoned off on a school campus, within a government
workplace, or even on a military base or prison, it triggers fewer
concerns about observers misunderstanding the messages conveyed in
that arena as government's own.
But even then, the argument for mandatory access still
encounters tough sledding, given the very broad discretion
government reserves over its property, its funds, and its imprimatur-
actual or perceived. American Library in particular illustrates this
point. Few people likely would see the government's imprint on a
decision by a private patron of the library to download pornography
on a library computer. On the contrary, many observers likely think
the library is a "public forum"-at least until they think more
carefully about the inevitable content-based decisions involved in
creating a collection. But the Court allowed restrictions on the grants
that required the computer filters, even in this First Amendment
sensitive space, inherently and often expressly dedicated to free
inquiry and exploration of ideas by private patrons.
The reason is that all of these cases entail a demand that the
courts rewrite the government's access rules-something courts are
unwilling to do even when First Amendment concerns loom large and
government imprimatur concerns are relatively attenuated.
Designing a government forum, program, or policy is inherently
content-specific work; often, it is viewpoint-specific. The government
nudges with its money and name and space, but it also pushes, pulls,
and shoves. This is a matter of government political and practical
judgment, and is decidedly not neutral.
Finally, one need not consider any of the more complex subrules
that surface in forum cases to resolve the constitutional issues. One
can simply run the fact pattern through the eight criteria listed above.
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This may not lead to results that are more internally coherent; this is
still a very context and fact-driven analysis. But it would eliminate
some of the misleading terminology, would reinstate up front the
concern about government imprimatur, and would give neutrality its
proper place, i.e., a way of expressing that government must observe
its own rules, and treat like supplicants alike, after it determines what
non-neutral ends it wishes to pursue.
4. Application to Martinez
The above summary of leading cases likely explains why the
Petitioners in Martinez worked so hard to locate the case in the
"forum" rather than "funding" column, and emphasized the cases in
which the Court regarded the government's creation of the forum as a
nigh-on public forum. The more the case looked like Widmar, Healy,
and Rosenberger the harder it was for Hastings to deny the group
equal RSO status and benefits. It also is why the Petitioners
emphasized the uneven application of the RSO forum rules, and
discounted the subsequent re-description of the access Policy as an
"all-comers" policy. Finally, this is why the Petitioners emphasized
the private nature of its activities, and that the members merely
sought to associate and express themselves-not "impose their moral
principles on others." 200
All of these moves were necessary to fit the CLS's case into the
one, narrow frame that led most easily-though still not without
doctrinal difficulty-to a conclusion that Hastings exceeded its
authority to craft RSO rules and enforce them. Moreover, these
moves would have limited the scope of a ruling in their favor-which
might have persuaded the crucial fifth justice to sign on to the ruling.
Once a case moves to the "funding" column, however, then the
doctrinal authority thins significantly-because selective funding just
is not easily characterized as "discrimination"; it more often is treated
as government policy to support some, but not other, worthy ends.
Short of turning off the funding spigot, government has to make
choices-ones that may be odd, partisan, clunky, heartless, ill-
considered-even stupid-but rarely unconstitutional. And the
choice made here-to prevent RSOs from discriminating on the basis
of characteristics that are commonly listed in nondiscrimination laws
nationwide-is exceedingly hard to characterize as constitutionally
200. Brief for Petitioners at 44, Christian Legal Soc., Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings
College of Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371).
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suspect-or "absurd" and "risible." It is easier, in fact, to
characterize as constitutionally required, despite the erosion of state
action and Establishment Clause barriers.
Petitioners' viewpoint and the dissent's position are testimony to
the very dramatic shifts in the state action, Establishment Clause, and
civil rights landscapes since the early 1970s. It also reflects just how
successful religious advocates have been in characterizing
nondiscrimination measures as a forbidden form of viewpoint
discrimination and as a virulently hostile form of "political
correctness" aimed at their convictions.
But again, the older case law has not been overruled, and the
constitutional values reflected in the older cases remain an important
backstop to the modern cases that have carried us so far from these
earlier moorings. Moreover, a majority of the Court still remains
wary of overstepping its boundaries, and setting up new restrictions
on conditional funding that may prove unworkable at best and
subversive of many important government ends at worst.
As applied to CLS and other religious groups in particular, this
judicial deference is a prickly matter. In CLS's view,
nondiscrimination mandates are themselves discriminatory. This is
why CLS fairly bristled at the notion that an all-comers policy might
require that student organizations cannot discriminate on the basis of
beliefs or status:
Far from being compelling, the all-comers policy is frankly
absurd. The notion that the Democratic Caucus should not be
able to "discriminate" against Republicans in the selection of
officers or discussion of group leaders is risible .... [S]urely no
one thinks that all people should mingle together randomly at
all times. Groups are built around common interests and
beliefs-interests and beliefs that are less than universal. Free
association, including the right to exclude, better facilitates the
goal of promoting an exchange of ideas; it protects the seedbeds
where ideas emerge and mature in the first place. There can be
no diversity of viewpoints in a forum if groups are not
permitted to form around viewpoints.20'
CLS's argument here has considerable appeal. The Petitioners
could-and did-point out that where government has moved to
include discrimination based on sexual orientation to the more
traditional list of prohibited forms of discrimination, it often has
201. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
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provided at least some exemption for religious groups.2" There
definitely is growing support for the notion that religion deserves
special legal treatment when antidiscrimination norms collide with
traditional religious convictions.
This does not (yet) prove the case, however. As the final section
shows, there is an important difference between exemptions built into
the design of government policies, and exemptions that are imposed
by the judiciary in response to lawsuits like Martinez. In the former
case, the government has expressed its policy preference, and when
the court assesses the relevant government interest, this stated
expression of government policy matters. In the latter case, the
government's silence makes it much harder to infer that an exemption
would not undermine the government's interests. Indeed, a contrary
inference is more plausible, given how common it is today for
government to build exceptions for religious actors into statutory
nondiscrimination schemes-especially when the nondiscrimination
scheme includes sexual orientation. The failure to do so, one can
argue, speaks volumes.
In sum, the Petitioners' real bottom line was not an objection to
different treatment by Hastings. Rather, the heart of their objection
was the government-imposed nondiscrimination policy, as written and
as construed. CLS wished to avoid the usual, though often harsh,
burden of being permitted to express dissenting views through
association and speech, but only without government benefits and
imprimatur.
Let me make one further point about the exemption argument.
There is good reason to think that the Petitioners would have stuck to
this objection only as it applied to a religious group's desire to
exclude members "who conduct their lives (unrepentantly) in
violation of ... [a well-established set of convictions regarding human
sexuality],"203 not to a religious group's desire to exclude members on
the basis of race. If a white supremacist religious (or nonreligious)
group sought a similar exemption from the RSO Nondiscrimination
Policy, then at least some of the lawyers for the Petitioners likely
would have been unwilling to pen a brief in support of this claim. The
Petitioners' reply brief contemptuously described such a "parade of
horribles" as "desperate hyperbole" 20; but a ruling in favor of CLS
202. Id. at 46.
203. Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
204. Reply Brief for Appellants at 52-53, Christian Legal Soc., Chapter of Univ. of
Cal. Hastings College of Law v. Kane, 319 F. App'x 645 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 06-15956).
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logically would have extended to such a group, no less than to CLS
itself. Recall that the doctrine invoked by the parties and by the
Court relies heavily on "neutrality" as the justification for the fullest
possible First Amendment protection.
The Petitioners nevertheless attempted to distinguish CLS
associational principles from supremacist groups by labeling the latter
as engaged in "invidious" discrimination.205 But a court faced with the
argument that both kinds of discrimination are "invidious" cannot
easily side with one over the other, especially while invoking a
neutrality justification. Such a distinction among forms of
associational expressive arguably would itself be "viewpoint
discriminatory."
In fact, CLS seemed to be arguing for an "all groups, all views"
RSO policy. This surely must embrace a supremacist student group-
as well as a Wiccan group, a socialist group, a Summum group, and
any others who applied for RSO status. A court could not craft a rule
prohibiting Hastings from adopting an "all-comers" policy without
demanding, in essence, that it adopt such an "all groups, all views"
policy instead.
If a judge somehow could cordon off race discrimination from
the freedom of expressive association ruling, without violating the
principles of "neutrality" CLS invokes, then why could Hastings not
cordon off other forms of discrimination from the RSO program
itself? One possibility is that CLS thinks government has a
compelling reason to prevent affinity groups from discriminating on
the basis of race-even when a religious group might insist this
violates their expressive association rights-but it lacks a compelling
reason to prevent affinity groups from discriminating on the basis of
sexual orientation. Race receives special Fourteenth and Thirteenth
Amendment protection. Yet neutrality does not explain this different
treatment of the government's interests here, and traditional First
Amendment analysis precludes it. The Equal Protection Clause may
rank order various bases for government discrimination-only some
government classifications trigger strict scrutiny-but it does not
impose a parallel hierarchy on government power to define its
program funding or other parameters. Government power over
programs designed to promote equal access for disabled Americans,
for example, are no less "compelling" than ones designed to promote
racial equality-even though disability triggers only "rational basis"
205. Id.
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scrutiny under equal protection. And a religious group that sought to
exclude members based on some perceived disability would have no
greater-or lesser-First Amendment rights than one that sought to
exclude members based on race.
And here's another rub: To require Hastings to grant RSO status
to a white supremacist organization in order to respect "neutrality"
would be to lose sight entirely of the long shadow of Frame One-
and of the government's legitimate interest in distancing itself from
sinister forms of private expressive autonomy. Racist speech is
allowed, of course, even on campus; but only in traditional or
designated public forums, and often with campus police present to
control for the potential disruption inspired by such provocative
discourse. To treat the law school's RSO program as a full public
forum would be far more "absurd" and "risible" than it may have
been to allow Hastings to control the program in ways that made such
collisions between its freedom of expression and nondiscrimination
aspirations less sharp.
Finally, to call this move mere "political correctness" is both
tiresome and a denial of the multiple ways in which modern
universities are expected to teach diverse students, not just permit
them to experience the greatest possible First Amendment freedoms.
Universities are unique environments devoted to First Amendment
principles and diversity of viewpoints. But they also are bounded
spaces in which messages are conveyed-messages for which the
campus leaders often are held accountable. The implicit analogy to a
street corner or public park weakens considerably once one moves
away from the campus mall, and once the school name is deployed as
it was in Martinez. The call to "neutrality" likewise becomes less
convincing, and the background concern about government
imprimatur becomes much more powerful.
F. Frame Six: Mandatory Access-Plus-Exemption
If mandatory access claims are difficult to win-and they are-
then mandatory access-plus-exemption claims are presumptive losers.
Government has fairly broad discretion to build exemptions into its
funding and regulatory schemes, as we have seen.206 Consequently, if
one frames Martinez as an exemption to funding conditions case, then
206. See supra notes 163-97 and accompanying text; see also Gonzales v. 0 Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709 (2005).
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the outcome was entirely consistent with the case law. It becomes,
just as Justice Stevens suggested, an easy case.
The easiest way to outline the case law under this frame is to
identify the isolated cases in which the Court has required exemptions
from conditions on forums or funding. Note that these isolated cases
do not deal with the related question of when exemptions from
general rules ("sticks") are constitutionally required.2' Rather, we
are concerned here only with cases that involve "carrots," and a
request from an applicant that the conditions on carrots that apply to
all other applicants be lifted for this applicant and others similarly
situated.
Nor do we deal here with statutes or other government
regulations that provide for such exemptions; in these cases
government already has determined that its policy ends would not be
unduly hampered by a patch work of compliance. Rather, the focus is
on the handful of cases in which the courts require the lifting a
condition on a benefit or forum access, in response to a claim that the
condition could not constitutionally be applied to a specific applicant.
The condition is lifted only for the complaining applicants (and others
like them) for government benefits or other support; it remains in
place as to all other participants.
So narrowed, the only significant Supreme Court case on point is
Sherbert v. Verner,208 in which a member of the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church was fired by her employer because she would not
work on her Sabbath (a Saturday). She filed a claim for
unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina
Unemployment Compensation Act and was denied on the ground
that her refusal to work on Saturdays was a refusal, without good
cause, to accept suitable work when offered. The Court held that this
disqualification for benefits was a burden on her free exercise of
religion, even though it did not prevent her from practicing her
faith.2' The pressure to forego her religious principles was significant,
and thus triggered Free Exercise Clause analysis. The Court held that
207. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (accommodation of
expressive association); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (accommodation of
religion); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (accommodation of
freedom of expression and resistance to compelled affirmation).
208. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
209. Id. at 404-06.
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absent a compelling state interest, South Carolina could not impose
this significant burden on her First Amendment rights.210
The Free Exercise Clause provenance of Sherbert was read
narrowly in Employment Division v. Smith,211 in which the Court
limited Sherbert to the unemployment compensation field and
perhaps other contexts that lend themselves "to individualized
governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct."212
Smith channeled the dissent in Sherbert, which noted that the
"situations in which the Constitution may require special treatment
on account of religion are ... far and few between, and this view is
amply supported by the course of constitutional litigation in this area.
Such compulsion in the present case is particularly inappropriate in
light of the indirect, remote, and insubstantial effect of the decision
below on the exercise of appellant's religion and in light of the direct
financial assistance to religion that today's decision requires."21 3
Indeed, the dissent continued, it has been noted that "such singling
out of religious conduct for special treatment may violate the
constitutional limitations on state action."214 The dissent rejected this
argument, concluding instead that the government could
accommodate the religious person without violating the
Establishment Clause,215 but the argument was hardly seen as far-
fetched.
And so we come full circle. For government to set access
conditions on its programs is not only permissible, but may be
required-as a matter of state action (here, of state action that
implicates the Establishment Clause). That is, Frames One and Two
affect some thinkers' view of Frame Six-and rightly so. For the
judiciary to step into a state of affairs and affirmatively require an
exemption-an exemption that the government itself has not
granted-is to disrupt the legal status quo, not preserve it. It also
disrupts democratic processes, in favor of the potentially
undemocratic (and illiberal) desire of some individuals to opt out of
common rules. And as the dissent in Sherbert notes, a judicial
210. Id. at 409-10.
211. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
212. Id. at 884.
213. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 423 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 422 (emphasis added).
215. Id.
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decision that does so may itself constitute state action, according to
some accounts.216
There are constitutional trap doors everywhere.
HI. Summing Up
The Court has moved a great distance from the sensibilities of
the 1960s and 1970s that made earlier justices more acutely aware of
the state action problem, and of how accommodation of private
actors who engage in actions that government itself wishes to (or
must) avoid is risky business. But government actors on the ground
today still understand the problem-perhaps better than the justices
themselves.
When, for example, school officials in school districts as
geographically and otherwise distinct as Seattle, Washington and
Jefferson County, Louisiana, saw how the racial stratification of their
neighborhoods was altering the composition of their public schools,
they acted.217
Likewise, when a Southern city saw how the pattern of its
government contracts was flowing disproportionately away from
minority contractors, it sought to address the disparity. 218
And when a Midwestern public university studied the effect of
past societal discrimination on student enrollments, it developed
programs and policies designed to counteract those forces.219
In each case, government actors worried about becoming passive
participants in wider societal patterns. They evidenced an intuitive
understanding that "public" and "private" are enmeshed in ways that
modern state action and equal protection doctrine tend to obscure.
They understood as well that the action and inaction of public
authorities, vested with public duties and supported by public funds,
are not neutral, not without cultural meaning, and not without legal
and political consequences. And they also were constrained-even
pushed-by Supreme Court opinions that limited many other ways in
which they might have worked against private discrimination directly.
At the very least, the officials may have thought they could cordon off
their own resources and communicate their own message of
216. Id.; see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
217. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
(plurality opinion).
21& See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
219. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003).
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nondiscrimination. It was the least and perhaps the most they could
do, in light of these other cases.
RSO policies that include nondiscrimination conditions need to
be read in this wider context. Universities nationwide continue to
wrestle with the passive participation dilemma, and understand that
their imprimatur matters. As they admit a diverse student
population-vastly more diverse than in decades past-they
encounter collisions of cultures and ideologies and sensibilities.
When they grant students implicit authority to act under the name of
the university, they also seek to teach them how to behave. A
nondiscrimination condition on RSO status exhorts these students to
a higher public ideal of open access, regardless of status and belief-
an ideal that collides inevitably and perpetually with the ideal of
private associational and ideological autonomy. This was a forum
case-as the parties agreed-but it was not an open forum case, and it
was not an open-and-shut one either.
There is no doubt that the Court must play a role here-the
Court ultimately draws the constitutional lines, even as it defers to
educators on matters of pedagogy. But it also must recognize that its
One First Street address lifts it very far above the government scenes
where these constitutional, cultural, and policy battles are now being
waged. It therefore makes sense for the Court to defer to educators',
city council members', and public employers' judgment-not because
they are "elites" imposing their political sensibilities on an unwilling
public, as some of the justices claim-but because they are there in
the trenches, working to advance the public values the justices
themselves have identified, and once tasked them with promoting,
then limited their tools for addressing. And in any event, it is
nonsense-"desperate hyperbole"-to paint the government officials
in all of these cases, in all of these American settings, with the same
political brush, or to assume they all are unmindful of the burdens of
their policies on dissenting citizens-let alone that they are openly
hostile to their concerns.
Of course, there are many times when judicial skepticism of these
government actors is supremely warranted-bias and capture
problems are perennial. Again, as I said in the opening section, one
person's worthy government end is another's unconstitutional
condition. But a nondiscrimination condition that compels "all-
comers" access to a government-authorized benefit-enforced in an
even-handed way-arguably stands near the bottom of the list of
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government policies likely to commit these constitutional errors,
because it does burden us all.220 The very list of organizations to
which application of the policy struck the CLS lawyers as "absurd"
belies a claim that it is also aimed primarily at them. Rather, such a
measure often-surely not always-is better seen as an effort to
distance government from the lingering taint of private discrimination
in which it fears it may be implicated, even if it does nothing at all.
This is especially true in this era of "undoing" civil rights-through
judicial decisions, voter initiatives, and other measures designed to
restore an ostensibly neutral status quo, despite proof that the world
is still racially and otherwise stratified.
Were the state action question still a foreground, versus
background concern, perhaps the Court would still be inclined to
make finer distinctions among these forms of government action.
Given its blunt-edged approach to the passive participation issue,
however-e.g., declaring racially stratified neighborhoods a private
concern, and not "resegregation"221 and preventing government from
using race-conscious methods to attack the effects of this
stratification-nondiscrimination conditions on benefits may be the
best, albeit imperfect, way for government to limit its involvement in
private patterns of discrimination. Government still must assure that
a true public forum remains open to expression that may be, or seem,
discriminatory; but it need not do more. And it surely need not
excuse those who wish to use government resources to perpetuate
private discrimination; however that may be defined in the years
ahead.
The doctrinal intricacies of Frames Four, Five, and Six obviously
dominated the discourse in Martinez and ultimately governed the
outcome. Neither the lawyers nor the justices likely could have been
expected to take the longer, theoretical view of the case outlined
here, or to spend time on analysis of alternative frames that plainly
would have produced one result, under modern doctrine. It thus
made perfect short-term sense for the Court to spend no time on
Frames One, Two, or Three.
220. An obvious and very important caveat to this claim are so-called "Civil Rights
Initiatives" (also called "Connerly Amendments"), voter-approved initiatives that prevent
government from "discriminating" on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in order to undo the remnants of affirmative action programs. See, e.g., Proposition
107, H.C.R. 2019, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
221. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 736.
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But something is lost, as I have shown here, when one moves too
quickly past the state action moorings of this and similar cases and
considers the longer term consequences and historical antecedents to
the problem at hand. In particular, one misses how state action
penumbras still affect how one balances the concerns that surface
more visibly in the other three frames of analysis, and how they also
may affect government actors who are striving to avoid lending
government imprimatur to some private conduct and expression-
perhaps especially religious conduct and expression, but certainly
discriminatory conduct and expression.
The state action frame also offers another way to examine the
Court's conditions on fora and funds cases. It shows that the Court
has taken the government off the constitutional hook in the vast
majority of cases in which it offers private parties funding, access to
its property, and other benefits. Without more, provision of such
benefits is not enough to make a private actor a "state actor."
But the Court also has given the government broad discretion-
and responsibility-to police its benefits and property to assure that
private participants observe public values. This may reflect the
Court's respect for state actors' ability to manage state action
principles without judicial supervision. Or it may simply reflect a
kind of pragmatism: The judiciary is simply not equipped to (or
inclined to) second-guess the government on all of these decisions. In
any event, it relocates but does not eliminate a central state action
concern-that government decisions inevitably convey government
imprimatur.
What swells, under this approach of shrinking state action and
limiting constitutional "conditions on conditions," is the middle
terrain-the "play in the joints"-where government may choose to
protect common resources and common spaces in ways that promote
its policy ends, without significant judicial oversight. The remaining
concern, then, is whether government will exercise this vast power
responsibly and humanely.
This obviously depends. As civil rights theorists pointed out
decades ago, in ways that CLS and other modern religious freedom
advocates now echo, selective indifference to the disparate
consequences of ostensibly even-handed rules still happens, and still
matters to the way in which citizens experience government actors
and government power. Even when the Court declares that
something is "private," it still can feel, and it still often is, very much a
matter of public power and of public concern.
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It thus was rather ironic that the justices who often seem least
inclined to define the constant interplay of public and private as
"state action," and who usually deny that disparate impact violates
the Constitution absent a discriminatory intent, viewed the disparate
impact of this government effort to maintain some modest distance
from religious and other private associational forms of discrimination,
and to control its message and its imprimatur by demanding
nondiscrimination, so offensive. But it was also ironic that the
justices who usually do see how passive participation happens, who
worry a lot about government entanglement with private
discriminatory conduct and ideas, and who do see how disparate
impact can wreak as much havoc on minority groups as can disparate
treatment, were not more apprehensive about the "play in the joints"
power reinforced in the case.
A final significant irony of Martinez was that the parties have so
much in common on this very point, though so often are at
constitutional odds. Few other groups today are more engaged in the
ongoing struggle over cultural belonging and government imprimatur,
than are religious and LGBT groups. Both seek government benefits
without conditions that would bar them full access. Both believe its
denial is a form of viewpoint and status-based discrimination. Both
feel the effects of the selective indifference problem in ways that
strike at their identity cores. Each is heard by the other as seeking
"special rights," not equal treatment. Each is seen by the other as
threatening and accusatory ("bigoted" and "damned"). Both appeal
to the courts for relief, even as they continue to appeal to other
government actors to alter policies that burden their private beliefs
and ways of living. Both have had significant victories in recent years.
Both want more. Neither is likely to find in a judicial ruling the
deeper satisfaction that can only come from a genuine and grassroots
sense of belonging to the community at large. Choosing between
their claims to belonging is not a neutral act.
Of course, public universities are neither courts nor legislatures;
they are places where government attempts to inculcate public values,
as well as transmit knowledge. There can be no "neutrality" in this
either-not in general, nor as applied to disputes about students'
conflicting civil rights.
Whether Hastings got it right, in its effort to juggle competing
evolving public ideals of equality, freedom of expressive autonomy,
freedom of religion, and a robust marketplace of ideas, remains to be
seen. But the Court in Martinez likely did get it right, in letting the
educators and students work out this particular conflict internally and
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locally-and in deeming the "all-comers" compromise as a
constitutionally permissible condition on the government's
imprimatur in this case. A ruling in favor of CLS would have
imperiled government power to control its involvements in private
discrimination without suspending a government program.
As other universities now wrestle with their existing policies, it
will be interesting to see whether they now abandon
nondiscrimination conditions on RSOs, adopt "all-comers" rules,
allow for expressive association exemptions upon request, or stick to
their policies as written where they enumerate specific categories of
prohibited discrimination and defend them in court. An unlikely
outcome, thanks to Martinez, is that they will abandon RSO programs
altogether, lest they be perceived as endorsing private discriminatory
conduct.
The aim of this piece has been to put this particular campus and
"unconstitutional conditions" dispute into a wider context of
government control over its imprimatur. I have argued that the Court
should revisit the state action fundamentals outlined here, and
acknowledge their relevance even when modern state action doctrine
does not. I also have proposed an eight-factored test that captures
this aspect of government power over its purse strings and property,
as well as the other constitutional values at play. In my view, this test
is a more accurate way to describe the enduring problem of
"unconstitutional conditions" than is current doctrine, because it
gives more explicit attention to how and why government imprimatur
still matters-to government actors, and to the people most affected
by their decisions. Whether the test would lead to more convincing
or internally coherent results is difficult to predict; the policy is
general, would apply to a vast terrain, and would be subject to judicial
interpretation-just like the current tests for conditions on subsidies
and fora. But it would, at least, ask the right questions, and identify
all of the relevant concerns. This would be a good first step in the
inevitable cases to follow.
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